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INTRODUCTION
Words and images do not worm their way into our
discourse by accident; they’re generally thrust there
by well-orchestrated campaigns intended to burn
them into our collective consciousness. Having
embarked on that endeavor, the originator of the
symbol necessarily—and justly—must give up
some measure of control. The originator must
understand that the mark or symbol or image is no
longer entirely its own, and that in some sense it
also belongs to all those other minds who have
received and integrated it. This does not imply a
total loss of control, however, only that the public’s
right to make use of the word or image must be
considered in the balance as we decide what rights
the owner is entitled to assert.1
In September of 2005, Justin Watt posted a digitally altered
image of a billboard to his website.2 The billboard queried:
“Straight? Unhappy? www.gay.com.”3 Watt’s image was his
tongue-in-cheek response to real-life billboards that Exodus
International, “a Christian organization whose objective is to make
gay people heterosexual through religion and counseling,” had
placed throughout the U.S.4 Exodus’s original ad had read: “Gay?
Unhappy? www.exodus.to.”5 Of course, no good deed goes
unpunished, and sure enough, Exodus’s attorney from the Liberty
Counsel sent a cease-and-desist letter to Watt on March 2, 2006.6
The letter claimed that Watt’s image infringed Exodus’s copyright
in the billboard; it further proclaimed that the “altered image
1

Alex Kozinski, Trademarks Unplugged, 68 N.Y.U. L. REV. 960, 975 (1993).
Lia Miller, Both Sides in Parody Dispute Agree on a Term: Unhappy, N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 27, 2006, at C7, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2006/03/27/technology/27
straight.html?scp=3&sq=Justin%20Watt&st=cse.
3
Justin Watt, My First Cease-and-Desist Letter, JUSTINSOMNIA (Mar. 2, 2006, 11:08
AM), http://justinsomnia.org/2006/03/my-first-cease-and-desist-letter (displaying Watt’s
parodic billboard); see also Miller, supra note 2.
4
Miller, supra note 2.
5
Id.
6
See Watt, supra note 3 (displaying Letter from Mathew D. Staver, Founder and
Chairman, Liberty Counsel to Justin Watt (no date available)).
2
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substantially diminishes the potential value of the original image as
utilized by Exodus on billboards across America and online.”7
Moreover, Exodus alleged that Watt’s use allegedly created a sense
of false sponsorship, as he had kept Exodus’s “E” logo in his sendup of the billboard.8 Because Exodus claimed that Watt had
misconstrued any fair use he might have made of the image, the
organization instructed Watt to
immediately cease use of the image on your web
site or in any other form. Please confirm your
agreement to this request, and please note your
confirmation that no other use is being or will be
made of the images or logo, by signing and
returning an original signature on a copy of this
letter at the address shown above . . . .9
Although Exodus’s assertion of trademark rights ostensibly
focused on the fact that Watt’s image conveyed a false impression
of sponsorship, the subtext of Exodus’s trademark allegation was
that Watt had tarnished its mark by using its imagery and
subverting its message. In other words, Watt’s positive reference
to homosexuality in his image prompted Exodus, the trademark
and copyright owner, to cry foul. Faced with Exodus’s assertion of
intellectual property rights, Justin Watt did not capitulate. Instead,
the ACLU and a Bay Area law firm agreed to represent him, and
they countered with a letter enumerating Watt’s fair use rights
under copyright law and First Amendment rights under trademark
law.10 Shortly thereafter, Exodus dropped its case against Watt.11
Flash forward to 2010. A blog following the progress of Perry
v. Schwarzenegger12 adopted a logo for its website deliberately

7

Id.
Id.
9
Id.
10
See Letter from Laurence F. Pulgram, Partner, Fenwick & West LLP, to Mathew D.
Staver, Chairman and Founder, Liberty Counsel (no date available), available at
http://justinsomnia.org/2006/03/a-response-to-liberty.
11
See Miller, supra note 2.
12
--- F. Supp. 2d ----, No. C 09-2292 VRW, 2010 WL 3025614 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 4,
2010).
8
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similar to that of an arch-nemesis, ProtectMarriage.com.13
ProtectMarriage.com’s logo had depicted a mother, father, and two
children (which is reminiscent of the silhouettes used to demarcate
men’s and women’s restrooms).14
The mark embodied
ProtectMarriage.com’s ideal of the traditional family. Prop 8 Trial
Tracker, however, reworked the logo to depict two mothers and
two children, a self-admitted parody of ProtectMarriage.com’s
trademark.15 And like Justin Watt, Courage Campaign promptly
received a cease-and-desist letter from ProtectMarriage.com,
which vigorously asserted its copyright and trademark rights in the
image.16
ProtectMarriage.com alleged, inter alia, that the
reworking of its logo would lead to a likelihood of confusion.17 In
its response letter, Courage Campaign’s counsel from Morrison &
Foerster cited precedent asserting Courage Campaign’s right to
parody the ProtectMarriage.com mark under trademark and
copyright law, and argued that under established trademark law,
there would be no likelihood of confusion.18
While the
ProtectMarriage.com cease-and-desist letter did not explicitly
mention tarnishment, the letter highlighted that “Courage
Campaign holds views that are diametrically opposed to
ProtectMarriage.com.”19 No doubt it took umbrage at Courage
Campaign’s parodic riffing on its trademark. Courage Campaign,

13

Julia Rosen, ProtectMarriage.com Issues Cease and Desist for Prop 8 Trial Tracker
Logo Depicting Family of Two Mothers with Two Kids, PROP 8 TRIAL TRACKER (Jan. 15,
2010),
http://prop8trialtracker.com/2010/01/15/protectmarriage-com-issues-cease-anddesist-for-prop-8-trial-tracker-logo. The Courage Campaign Institute created the Prop 8
Trial Tracker site. About, PROP 8 TRIAL TRACKER, http://prop8trialtracker.com/about (last
visited Apr. 3, 2010).
14
Rosen, supra note 13 (displaying Letter from John M. Skeriotis, Partner, Brouse
McDowell LPA, to Richard D. Jacobs, Founder and Chair, Courage Campaign (Jan. 12,
2010)).
15
Id.
16
See id.
17
Id.
18
See id. (displaying Letter from Nathan B. Sabri, Associate, Morrison Foerster LLP,
to John M. Skeriotis, Partner, Brouse McDowell LPA (Jan. 14, 2010)).
19
Id. (displaying Letter from John M. Skeriotis, Partner, Brouse McDowell LPA, to
Richard D. Jacobs, Founder and Chair, Courage Campaign (Jan. 12, 2010)).
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on the other hand, recoded a mark it deemed offensive to provide
commentary and empowerment in its fight for marriage equality.20
As Watt’s and Courage Campaign’s experiences demonstrate,
brands of all shapes, sizes, and political persuasions are
ubiquitous21 and sometimes even insidious. Moreover, brands
have become part of our daily fabric and lexicon.22 As our brandawareness has increased, so has our ability to imbue brands with
meaning,23 whether these meanings accord with the brand identity
a company intends to convey or not. Individuals seek to comment
on and fight brand hegemony by, for example, poking fun at a
particularly cloying cultural symbol,24 or by subverting and
recoding a brand’s intended message.25
Trademark owners, however, benefit from a variety of causes
of action, such as trademark infringement and trademark dilution,
20

How ProtectMarriage.com Can Get Back at Courage Campaign’s Logo Lift: GayUp CC’s Logo, QUEERTY, http://www.queerty.com/how-protectmarriage-com-can-getback-at-courage-campaigns-logo-lift-gay-up-ccs-logo-20100116/#ixzz0k6CWWZXc
(last visited Apr. 4, 2010).
21
See Rebecca Tushnet, Gone in Sixty Milliseconds: Trademark Law and Cognitive
Science, 86 TEX. L. REV. 507, 511 (2008) (“Consumers are inundated with ads, not just in
traditional media but in bathroom stalls, sidewalk decals, even ads covering the paint
strips in parking lots.”).
22
See generally Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, Expressive Genericity: Trademarks as
Language in the Pepsi Generation, 65 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 397 (1990) (arguing that
expressive uses of marks should be allowed under the doctrine of “expressive
genericity”).
23
See, e.g., ROSEMARY J. COOMBE, THE CULTURAL LIFE OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTIES:
AUTHORSHIP, APPROPRIATION, AND THE LAW 57 (1998) (“The consumption of
commodified representational forms is productive activity in which people engage in
meaning-making to adapt signs, texts, and images to their own agendas. These practices
of appropriation or ‘recoding’ cultural forms are the essence of popular culture,
understood by theorists of postmodernism to be central to the political practice of those in
subordinate social groups and marginal to the centers of cultural production.”).
24
See, e.g., Mattel, Inc. v. MCA Records, Inc., 296 F.3d 894, 902, 906–07 (9th Cir.
2002) (holding that the group Aqua’s tongue-in-cheek song, “Barbie Girl,” was not an
actionable use under the Federal Trademark Dilution Act and that it was a successful
parody).
25
See, e.g., Mattel, Inc. v. Walking Mountain Prods., 353 F.3d 792, 802 (9th Cir.
2003) (maintaining that the artist provided social commentary on Barbie by placing
“carefully positioned, nude, and sometimes frazzled looking Barbies in often ridiculous
and apparently dangerous situations”); NAOMI KLEIN, NO LOGO 280 (2d ed. 2002)
(describing “culture jamming, the practice of parodying advertisements and hijacking
billboards in order to drastically alter their messages”).

C04_RSG_10-24-10_FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

2010]

10/24/2010 12:36 PM

CEASE-AND-DESIST: TARNISHMENT’S BLUNT SWORD

1247

which they often wield to silence commentary on their marks.26
This clash of trademark law with freedom of expression is
especially unsettling when a trademark owner uses trademark law
to silence speech it finds offensive and unseemly, specifically
when related to sex and sexuality. Mark owners do so in order to
shield their carefully cultivated brand images from tarnishment;
often, however, they do so bluntly without distinguishing between
truly prurient associations and those that are merely linked with
expressions of sexual orientation that deviate from the societal
norm. Even more unsettling is that trademark owners can often
silence speech that they deem distasteful without recourse to a
formal adjudication—they may simply draft an artfully worded
cease-and-desist letter asserting their intellectual property rights.
Justin Watt’s predicament is not uncommon. Nor was Prop 8
Trial Tracker’s skirmish with ProtectMarriage.com. A simple
search on Google for cease-and-desist letters brings up thousands
of hits. The Chilling Effects Clearinghouse catalogues and
displays letters sent to companies and individuals.27 These
communiqués have become increasingly common, even as courts
concomitantly seek to reign in trademark law’s grasp, especially in
the dilution context.28
Thus, while courts have become
increasingly more receptive to protecting speech that trademark
26

See COOMBE, supra note 23, at 72 (“Concepts as vague as loss of distinctiveness and
tarnishment have the capacity to escalate into a general power to prohibit all
reproductions of a mark and ‘grow into a powerful vehicle for the suppression of
unwelcome speech.’” (quoting Robert C. Denicola, Trademarks as Speech:
Constitutional Implications of the Emerging Rationales for the Protection of Trade
Symbols, 1982 WIS. L. REV. 158, 190)).
27
The Chilling Effects Clearinghouse is “[a] joint project of the Electronic Frontier
Foundation and Harvard, Stanford, Berkeley, University of San Francisco, University of
Maine, George Washington School of Law, and Santa Clara University School of Law
clinics.” CHILLING EFFECTS CLEARINGHOUSE, http://www.chillingeffects.org (last visited
Apr. 7, 2010).
28
Clarisa Long, Dilution, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1029, 1031 (2006) (“Judicial
enforcement of dilution law is not robust today and has been eroding over time. . . .
[R]elief rates have been on a downward trajectory since then. It could well be the case
that dilution law is a powerful bargaining chip in cease-and-desist letters and in
negotiations entirely outside the litigatory arena. In the federal courts, however, dilution
cases are not exactly a juggernaut. That is not to say that dilution law lacks seductive
appeal, but rather that is seems not to have worked its wiles on the judicial mind as many
feared.”).
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owners say is tarnishing (especially as applied to sexually
connotative uses or uses that reference a mark in association with
sexuality), cease-and-desist letters make an end-run around
judicially and statutorily created protective doctrines by
preempting this kind of speech before it can even get into court.
Current cease-and-desist practice raises many concerns, not the
least of which is that cease-and-desist letters have become a form
of private-action prior restraint arguably more potent than
preliminary injunctions. Indeed, to the uninitiated lay person, a
cease-and-desist letter is often the death-knell to his or her nonactionable use of a trademark. As Professor Ramsay aptly puts it,
“Those who cannot afford to litigate will self-censor rather than
fight for their right of free expression.”29 Thus, the real struggle is
to craft protection from the chilling power of cease-and-desist
letters that assert rights beyond the permissible scope of trademark
doctrine. Moreover, it is most often behemoth companies policing
their brands who send these letters to defendants who cannot bear
the costs of litigation.30 While many scholars recommend honing
trademark doctrine to avoid this chilling effect,31 others focus on
procedural protections that may curb overreaching by trademark
owners.
More well-reasoned doctrinal interpretations will
arguably elucidate standards for those well-versed in trademark
law, however, they may be inaccessible to the layperson. For this
reason, procedural protections may have a more deterrent effect on
mark holders. Ultimately, the law must craft an effective
combination of doctrinal adjustments and procedural mechanisms
while ensuring that the average layperson is aware of those rights.

29

Lisa P. Ramsay, Increasing First Amendment Scrutiny of Trademark Law, 61 SMU
L. REV. 381, 381 (2008).
30
See, e.g., Barton Beebe, The Continuing Debacle of U.S. Antidilution Law: Evidence
from the First Year of Trademark Dilution Revision Act Case Law, 24 SANTA CLARA
COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 449, 458 n.36 (“It may well be that the primary success of
antidilution law to date is that it empowers potential plaintiffs with a greater ability to
threaten potential defendants, particularly those that are unsophisticated, with prohibitive
litigation costs.”).
31
See, e.g., William McGeveran, Rethinking Trademark Fair Use, 94 IOWA L. REV.
49, 109–22 (2008) [hereinafter McGeveran, Rethinking].
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Part I of this Note will examine how tarnishment causes of
action in the courts have become increasingly more favorable to
defendants who use trademarks in reference to sexuality or in
sexually connotative ways. Part II, on the other hand, will
emphasize the distinction between recodings that are sexually
explicit or overtly suggestive and those that express ideas about
and attributes of sexual orientation. Arguably, uses in the latter
category are generally more worthy of protection from a First
Amendment standpoint. Further, it will illustrate how cease-anddesist letters have sought to silence these kinds of uses and why
this is especially problematic for marginalized groups, such as the
gay, lesbian, bisexual, and transgender community. Many mark
owners thus make an end-run around built-in statutory and First
Amendment speech protections that defendants may use in
litigation. Indeed, this Part will underscore that several scholars
see this free-wheeling use of cease-and-desist letters as an abusive
litigation tactic. Part III will juxtapose doctrinal solutions to this
problem, including clarification of the Trademark Dilution
Revision Act’s exemptions and a proper substantive definition of
tarnishment, with procedural remedies, which include reviving the
trademark misuse doctrine, utilizing anti-SLAPP statutes, and feeshifting. Finally, this Note will suggest that any doctrinal changes
must be accompanied by procedural remedies, which may be more
effective in curbing abusive behavior. This Note will also propose
further steps that the law should take to allow trademark recoders
and parodists to act affirmatively when faced with a cease-anddesist letter, including the complete abolishment of tarnishment as
an actionable offense under trademark law.
I. TARNISHMENT: A MORE PROLIFIC PAST AND DWINDLING
PRESENT?
While tarnishment has had an influential (and some would say
ignominious) influence on trademark law, its presence in litigated
cases has increasingly dwindled.32 Moreover, courts have arguably
32

See Beebe, supra note 30, at 450 (“Most significantly, the case law shows the
remarkable extent to which courts continue to treat the dilution cause of action as
redundant of—and, thus, made superfluous by—the infringement cause of action. For all
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become more and more sympathetic to defendants who seek to use
trademarks in ways that mark owners may deem offensive and
inconsistent with their brand’s image.33 This Part will briefly
examine the genesis of dilution and tarnishment and discuss the
evolution of case law as it applies to uses of marks that are
sexually explicit or that reference sexuality.34
A. A Brief Primer on the Tarnishment Cause of Action
Dilution law has its genesis in Frank I. Schecter’s seminal
article, The Rational Basis for Trademark Protection, published in
1927.35 In his article, Schecter expressed concern about
the gradual whittling away or dispersion of the
identity and hold upon the public mind of the mark
or name by its use upon non-competing goods. The
more distinctive or unique the mark, the deeper is
its impress upon the public consciousness, and the
greater its need for protection against vitiation or
dissociation from the particular product in
connection with which it has been used.36
Under existing trademark law at that time, “protection was
unlikely from a mark’s appropriation for goods of different
descriptive properties.”37 Instead, trademark law was confined to
its twin rationales: protecting consumers from confusion and
deception and trademark owners from unfair competition.38
of the legislative and academic attention paid to it, antidilution law continues to have no
appreciable effect on the outcomes of federal trademark cases or the remedies issuing
from those outcomes.”); Long, supra note 28, at 1057 (“Tarnishment is generally not a
popular theory of dilution among trademark plaintiffs. Courts have tended not to favor
tarnishment theory of dilution either.”); infra Part I.B.5.
33
See infra Part I.B.
34
At the outset, it is important to underscore that these two kinds of trademark
recodings are not equivalent, and that references to sexuality often do not have any
sexually explicit content.
35
Frank I. Schecter, The Rational Basis for Trademark Protection, 40 HARV. L. REV.
813 (1927).
36
Id. at 825.
37
Jerre B. Swann, Dilution Redefined for the Year 2002, 92 TRADEMARK REP. 585,
587 (2002).
38
Mark McKenna contends, however, that trademark law traditionally was primarily
premised on unfair competition and that benefits to consumers’ interests, while “welcome
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Indeed, it was not until twenty years later that Massachusetts
became the first state to enact a dilution statute,39 and states
thereafter began to extend protection beyond the traditional
likelihood of confusion context.40 As Professor Long has noted,
“[D]ilution law is producer-focused rather than consumerfocused . . . . [Its] underlying assumption is that the unauthorized
use of a famous mark by third parties, even when consumers are
not confused by the use of the mark, can diminish the mark’s
selling power.”41 Dilution remained a “creature of state law,”42
however, until 1995, when Congress passed the Federal Trademark
Dilution Act (the “FTDA”).43 Prior to the enactment of the FTDA,
however, federal courts often got into the fray and helped
“‘defin[e] the doctrine’s parameters.’”44
In crafting the scope of this doctrine, federal courts recognized
that a mark could be diluted in two ways: first, by blurring, “where
the defendant uses or modifies the plaintiff’s trademark to identify
the defendant’s goods and services, raising the possibility the mark
will lose its ability to serve as a unique identifier of the plaintiff’s
product;”45 and second, by tarnishment, whereby “the plaintiff’s
byproducts,” were a secondary consideration. Mark McKenna, Testing Modern
Trademark Law’s Theory of Harm, 95 IOWA L. REV. 63, 72 (2009); see also Mark
McKenna, The Normative Foundations of Trademark Law, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
1839, 1848 (2007) (“Trademark law, indeed all of unfair competition law, was designed
to promote commercial morality and protect producers from illegitimate attempts to
divert their trade. Consumer confusion was relevant to the traditional determination of
infringement not for its own sake, but because deceiving consumers was a particularly
effective way of stealing a competitor’s trade.”).
39
Moseley v. V Secret Catalogue, 537 U.S. 418, 430 (2003).
40
See Sarah L. Burstein, Dilution by Tarnishment: The New Cause of Action, 98
TRADEMARK REP. 1189, 1193 (2008).
41
Long, supra note 28, at 1034.
42
Mattel, Inc. v. MCA Records, Inc., 296 F.3d 894, 903 (9th Cir. 2002).
43
Federal Trademark Dilution Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-98, 109 Stat. 985 (1996),
repealed by Trademark Dilution Revision Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-312, 120 Stat.
1730.
44
Burstein, supra note 40, at 1199 (quoting Elliot B. Staffin, The Dilution Doctrine:
Towards a Reconciliation with the Lanham Act, 6 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT.
L.J. 105, 108–09 (1995)). As Burstein notes, “in interpreting state dilution statutes, it was
not uncommon for courts to cite general propositions about dilution law from nonbinding decisions in other jurisdictions that were interpreting different, though similarlyworded, state statutes.” Id.
45
Deere & Co. v. MTD Prods., Inc., 41 F.3d 39, 43 (2d Cir. 1994).
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trademark is linked to products of shoddy quality or is portrayed in
an unwholesome or unsavory context likely to evoke unflattering
thoughts about the owner’s product.”46 As Sarah Burstein notes,
however, tarnishment case law was often “inconsistent” before the
enactment of the FTDA, and further, “very few cases were decided
on tarnishment alone.”47 Part of this inconsistency arose because
courts sometimes conflated tarnishment with their likelihood of
confusion analyses;48 at other times, courts varied in their
willingness to afford speech protection to defendants who had
allegedly tarnished a plaintiff’s mark.49
After the FTDA took effect in 1996, courts continued to rely on
pre-FTDA case law for tarnishment standards.50 At the same time,
the FTDA sought to avoid some of the prior inconsistency in case
law based on state statutes by providing that
the owner of a mark could obtain relief against a
junior user if: (1) the senior mark was famous; (2)
the junior user made “commercial use in commerce
of a mark or trade name;” (3) which use started after
the senior user’s mark became famous; (4) and
which “cause[d] dilution of the distinctive quality”
of the senior user’s mark.51

46

Id.
Burstein, supra note 40, at 1200.
48
See, e.g., MGM-Pathe Commc’ns, Co. v. Pink Panther Patrol, 774 F. Supp. 869,
871–73 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) (granting a permanent injunction ostensibly on solely
infringement grounds, but allowing considerations of tarnishment to enter the likelihood
of confusion analysis); Burstein, supra note 40, at 1203.
49
Compare L.L. Bean, Inc. v. Drake Publishers, Inc., 811 F.2d 26, 33 (1st Cir. 1987)
(“The Constitution does not, however, permit the range of the anti-dilution statute to
encompass the unauthorized use of a trademark in a noncommercial setting such as an
editorial or artistic context.”), with Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders, Inc. v. Pussycat
Cinema Ltd., 604 F.2d 200, 206 (2d Cir. 1979) (“Plaintiff’s trademark is in the nature of
a property right, and as such it need not ‘yield to the exercise of First Amendment rights
under circumstances where adequate alternative avenues of communication exist.’”
(internal citations omitted) (quoting Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 551, 567 (1972))).
50
See, e.g., Hormel Foods Corp. v. Jim Henson Prods., 73 F.3d 497, 507 (2d Cir.
1996) (citing pre-FTDA case law).
51
Burstein, supra note 40, at 1196 (quoting Federal Trademark Dilution Act of 1995,
Pub. L. No. 104-98, § 3, 109 Stat. 985, 985 (1996), repealed by Trademark Dilution
Revision Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-312, 120 Stat. 1730).
47
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The federal act thus required that the senior mark be famous,
and, in recognition of the more expressive uses of trademarks,
required that the junior make “commercial use in commerce of a
mark.”52
Although the “commercial use in commerce”
requirement was awkwardly worded at best, it may have been
merely “an attempt by Congress to make absolutely clear that
noncommercial uses were not actionable.”53 Moreover, seeking to
avoid the inconsistency in exemptions courts had crafted when
applying state dilution statutes, the FTDA provided three
exemptions: “(A) Fair use of a famous mark by another person in
comparative commercial advertising or promotion to identify the
competing goods or services of the owner of the famous mark[;]
(B) Noncommercial use of a mark[; and] (C) All forms of news
reporting and news commentary.”54 Following the enactment of
this law, however, courts were still not clear as to what kinds of
uses would fall under the “noncommercial use” exemption, and
some struggled to apply the statute to allegedly tarnishing uses of a
trademark owner’s mark.55
When the federal dilution standards failed to provide adequate
clarity for the courts as to what kind of evidentiary showing the
federal dilution action required and what kind of uses it covered,
Congress stepped in again. The Trademark Dilution Revision Act
of 2006 (the “TDRA”) expanded upon the exceptions provided.56

52

Id.
Id. at 1228 (emphasis added).
54
Id. at 1197 (quoting Federal Trademark Dilution Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-98, §
3, 109 Stat. 985, 986 (1996), repealed by Trademark Dilution Revision Act of 2006, Pub.
L. No. 109-312, 120 Stat. 1730).
55
See, e.g., Am. Dairy Queen Corp. v. New Line Prods., Inc., 35 F. Supp. 2d 727,
732–35 (D. Minn. 1998) (rejecting the defendant’s argument that its film title was
protected under the noncommercial use exemption of the FTDA and further contending
that First Amendment concerns were unfounded because “alternative avenues for
expressing the idea exist[ed]”).
56
Section 1125(c)(3) reads, in relevant part:
The following shall not be actionable as dilution by blurring or
dilution by tarnishment under this subsection:
(A) Any fair use, including a nominative or descriptive fair use,
or facilitation of such fair use, of a famous mark by another
person other than as a designation of source for the person’s
own goods or services, including use in connection with—
53
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In addition, it expressly incorporated “tarnishment” into the
Lanham Act and defined it as “association arising from the
similarity between a mark or trade name and a famous mark that
harms the reputation of the famous mark.”57
Further exegesis on the statutory development of tarnishment is
beyond the scope of this paper, but it is important to note that
while tarnishment has become an express part of the TDRA, courts
still rely on pre-TDRA and pre-FTDA cases to define what
constitutes tarnishment of a mark and what tests should be applied
to determine what uses are actionable.58
B. Sex and Sexuality in the Tarnishment Case Law: A Mixed Bag?
As the doctrine of dilution by tarnishment developed in the
courts, one thing became clear: some courts had a “distaste” for
content involving sex and sexuality.59 On the other hand, other
courts were less willing to enjoin speech that included sexual uses
of a mark on First Amendment grounds.60 To some extent, these
approaches created inconsistency among the circuits regarding
how to approach tarnishment and how much First Amendment
protection a defendant should receive.

(i) advertising or promotion that permits consumers to
compare goods or services; or
(ii) identifying and parodying, criticizing, or commenting
upon the famous mark owner or the goods or services of
the famous mark owner.
(B) All forms of news reporting and news commentary.
(C) Any noncommercial use of a mark.
15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(3) (2006).
57
Id. § 1125(c)(2)(C).
58
See infra Part I.B.1–4. Indeed, Barton Beebe emphasizes that courts have not
faithfully applied the new TDRA provisions, applying FTDA exemptions, rationales, and
case law instead; he aptly maintains that “[t]he dead hand of the FTDA still plagues the
law.” See Beebe, supra note 30, at 455–58, 467.
59
Michael K. Cantwell, Confusion, Dilution, and Speech: First Amendment
Limitations on the Trademark Estate: An Update, 94 TRADEMARK REP. 547, 549–50
(2004).
60
See, e.g., L.L. Bean, Inc. v. Drake Publishers, Inc., 811 F.2d 26, 30 (1st Cir. 1987)
(“The basis for the district court’s injunction was that Bean’s trademark had been
tarnished by the parody in defendant’s magazine. We think this was a constitutionally
impermissible application of the anti-dilution statute.”).
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After the enactment of the FTDA in 1995 and the subsequent
revision of dilution law in 2006, however, it seemed that courts
were embracing an increasingly expansive notion of what speech
would be exempted under federal law. Moreover, as Professor
Long’s research has demonstrated, dilution lawsuits are litigated
less and less.61 This amounts to a greater likelihood of success for
defendants if tarnishment claims are actually litigated.62
This section will examine the contours of tarnishment law as it
applies to sex and sexuality and will highlight some of the
doctrinal difficulties that have arisen in these cases. It will also
draw a distinction between tarnishment cases based on overt
references to sex and those that involve references to sexuality and
sexual orientation.
1. Pre-FTDA Tarnishment
Pre-FTDA tarnishment cases conflicted in their treatment of
marks associated with sexuality. On the one hand, several courts
evinced a strong concern for marks that were associated with
pornographic movies or magazines. While the reputational
concerns these courts expressed may have had validity, the courts
did not explain why. In other words, they did not elucidate what
particularly is “tarnishing” about the uses, other than to say that the
contexts in which the defendants used the marks were “revolting”63
or “depraved.”64 The courts did not circumscribe the scope of
tarnishment, nor did they define it. These judicial tendencies
inevitably raise First Amendment concerns because trademark
owners may thus silence speech that may not be actionable.
The paradigmatic case in this area is Dallas Cowboys
Cheerleaders, Inc. v. Pussycat Cinema, Ltd.65 This case involved
the defendant’s use of a cheerleading uniform that was similar to

61

See infra Part I.B.5.
As the next part will demonstrate, this greater likelihood of success is a pyrrhic
victory for would-be recoders and parodists of famous marks, as cease-and-desist letters
often chill speech before it can formally receive judicial protection.
63
Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders, Inc. v. Pussycat Cinema Ltd., 604 F.2d 200, 203 (2d
Cir. 1979).
64
Id. at 205.
65
604 F.2d 200 (2d Cir. 1979).
62
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that of the actual Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders’ uniforms in
Debbie Does Dallas, an adult film.66 Specifically, the plaintiff was
upset by the fact that many of the actresses in the film wore these
uniforms while performing various sexual acts.67 Moreover, the
defendants’ movie posters featured captions such as “Starring Ex
Dallas Cowgirl Cheerleader Bambi Woods” and “You’ll do more
than cheer for this X Dallas Cheerleader.”68 The plaintiff owners
of the mark sued the defendants for trademark infringement under
the Lanham Act and for dilution under section 368-d of the New
York General Business Law.69 The District Court for the Southern
District of New York issued a preliminary injunction prohibiting
the distribution and exhibition of the film.70 The Second Circuit
later held that the plaintiff’s trade dress had acquired secondary
meaning and was thus protectable, and that the defendant had
demonstrated there was a likelihood of both confusion and
dilution.71 It then affirmed the preliminary injunction issued by the
district court on both the trademark infringement and state law
dilution grounds.72
In its analysis, the court made no efforts to hide its disdain for
the film—“Debbie Does Dallas,” for example, was “a gross and
revolting sex film.”73 Indeed, the court’s moral opprobrium
permeated the opinion. In holding that there was a likelihood of
confusion as to the sponsorship of the film, the court proclaimed
that “it is hard to believe that anyone who had seen defendants’
sexually depraved film could ever thereafter disassociate it from
plaintiff’s cheerleaders” and that the plaintiff had a right to
“‘control his product’s reputation.’”74 Strictly speaking, there was
no likelihood of confusion here;75 rather the court maintained that
66

Id. at 202–03.
See id. at 203.
68
Id.
69
Id.
70
Id. at 202.
71
Id. at 205.
72
Id. at 207.
73
Id. at 202.
74
Id. at 205 (quoting James Burrough Ltd. v. Sign of the Beefeater, Inc., 540 F.2d 266,
274 (7th Cir. 1976)).
75
A finding of likelihood of confusion was more appropriate, however, with respect to
the defendants’ poster, which claimed that one of the stars was an “X Dallas
67
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sponsorship could follow from mere association.76 As one
commentator has noted, “The finding of a likelihood of confusion
in the Dallas Cowboys . . . decision[] is best understood as
reflective of [the] court’s strongly negative reaction to the nature of
the parody. Yet the fact that the court[] [was] not amused does not
mean that consumers are confused.”77 And yet, the court’s dilution
analysis is all but absent—it seems to presume that dilution will
occur without examining any of the requirements under New York
State law for that cause of action.
Moreover, the court brushed aside any First Amendment
concerns, brusquely opining:
That defendants’ movie may convey a barely
discernible message does not entitle them to
appropriate plaintiff’s trademark in the process of
conveying that message. Plaintiff’s trademark is in
the nature of a property right, and as such it need
not “yield to the exercise of First Amendment rights
under circumstances where adequate alternative
avenues of communication exist.”78
Nor was this preliminary injunction an “unconstitutional ‘prior
restraint.’”79 As the court noted, this case was a private plaintiff’s
Cheerleader.” Id. at 203; see Robert N. Kravitz, Trademarks, Speech, and the Gay
Olympics Case, 69 B.U. L. REV. 131, 149–50 (1989) (“The court could have plausibly
limited its finding of confusion to the film’s advertisements, which falsely suggested that
the film starred an ex-Dallas Cowboys Cheerleader. But if the likelihood of confusion
was limited to the advertisements, the court should have enjoined only the advertisements
and not blocked exhibition of the film itself.” (footnote omitted)); see also Denicola,
supra note 26, at 206 (“Yet the sweeping rejection of the defendant’s [F]irst
[A]mendment claim in Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders is dangerously simplistic.”).
76
Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders, 604 F.2d at 204–05.
77
Cantwell, supra note 59, at 556; see also Kravitz, supra note 75, at 149–50 (“[I]t
seems highly unlikely that a reasonable viewer would believe that the Dallas Cowboys
Cheerleaders in any way sponsored or approved the film, or the use of the uniform,
simply because a character in the film wore the uniform . . . . Quite clearly, the court
primarily based its decision to uphold the plaintiff’s prohibition on the tarnishment
rationale—that the plaintiff’s reputation would be degraded through association with
what the court saw as a ‘gross and revolting sex film.’” (quoting Dallas Cowboys
Cheerleaders, 604 F.2d at 202)).
78
Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders, 604 F.2d at 206 (quoting Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner,
407 U.S. 551, 567 (1972)).
79
Id.
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action to “protect its property rights,” and the “prohibition of the
Lanham Act is content neutral,” therefore, there were no
constitutional concerns.80
Thus the Second Circuit’s main concern was protecting the
Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders’ trade dress (their uniform) from
any unseemly association. Yet the court did not illustrate the
contours of properly tarnishing uses, relying instead on a
“strained” notion of likelihood of confusion.81 The court did not
elaborate on where to draw the lines between unfavorable, though
unactionable, uses of a mark and actionable uses, if any lines were
to be drawn at all. The court seemed to indicate that a mark owner
has unfettered rights to control its brand image.
Even more concerning in Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders was
the court’s flippant treatment of the First Amendment. As one
commentator underscored, “This decision to enjoin showings of
the film to protect the plaintiff’s reputational interest in its
trademark cannot be reconciled with [F]irst [A]mendment
principles. There was no finding that the defendant’s film was
obscene under [F]irst [A]mendment standards.”82 The court thus
enjoined this speech because it simply found the film disgusting; it
never allowed a jury to determine whether this speech was
obscenity under Miller v. California’s83 standards, nor did it
attempt to define the contours of tarnishing uses, other than by
visceral, subjective reactions.
Similarly, in Pillsbury Co. v. Milky Way Productions, Inc.,84
the district court failed to define the scope of tarnishment, while
providing injunctive relief on dilution grounds.85 In Milky Way
Productions, the defendant, who owned the adult magazine, Screw,
80

Id.
See Denicola, supra note 26, at 206 (“Although decided by an obviously strained
reference to the confusion rationale, the court undoubtedly came closer to the true basis
of its decision when it stated: ‘Indeed, it is hard to believe that anyone who had seen
defendant’s sexually depraved film could ever thereafter disassociate it from plaintiff’s
cheerleaders.’” (quoting Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders, 604 F.2d at 205)).
82
Kravitz, supra note 75, at 150–51.
83
413 U.S. 15 (1973). For an enumeration of the three-pronged Miller test, see infra
note 303.
84
No. C78-679A, 1981 WL 1402 (N.D. Ga. Dec. 24, 1981).
85
Id. at *14.
81
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published photos of clay “figures resembling [Pillsbury’s] trade
characters ‘Poppin’ Fresh’ and ‘Poppie Fresh’” engaged in various
sexual acts, including fellatio.86 The pictures also contained
Pillsbury’s trademark and parts of its advertising jingle.87
Pillsbury sued Milky Way Productions, alleging, inter alia,
copyright infringement, federal and state trademark infringement,
and dilution under Georgia law.88 The district court held that there
was no likelihood of confusion arising from the defendant’s use of
Pillsbury’s marks, primarily because the “parties’ products and
retail outlets . . . [were] substantially dissimilar” and there was a
lack of actual confusion.89
On the dilution claim, however, the court found that there was
“a likelihood that the defendants’ presentation could injure the
business reputation of the plaintiff or dilute the distinctive quality
of its trademarks.”90 Yet the court did not give a fulsome
explanation of its reasoning in this part of the decision. Rather, it
seemed to agree with the plaintiff that “Milky Way has tarnished
the reputation, and thereby impaired the effectiveness, of its
advertising agents by placing them in a ‘depraved context.’”91 But
what exactly is depravity? The court does not tell us.92

86

Id. at *1.
Id.
88
Id.
89
Id. at *13.
90
Id. at *14.
91
Id.
92
Similarly, the court in Edgar Rice Burroughs, Inc. v. High Society Magazine, Inc., 7
Media L. Rep. 1862 (BNA) (S.D.N.Y. 1981), did not elaborate on what exactly
tarnishment is. The case involved a thirteen page spread in High Society magazine of the
characters Tarzan and Jane engaged in sexual situations. Id. at 1863. These uses of the
characters were unauthorized. Id. In granting a preliminary injunction for the trademark
owner, the court merely noted that
[t]he reputation and good will with the public and among publishers,
motion picture and TV producers, and in the publishing and
entertainment fields which used the literary works authored by the
late Edgar Rice Burroughs, the creator of the Tarzan and Jane
characters and characterizations, have undoubtedly been besmirched,
tarnished, and debased by the defendants and their magazine.
Id. at 1864.
87
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Despite the lack of clarity concerning tarnishment and
sexuality in these cases,93 other courts began to rely on them to
craft a rule in which tarnishment would “generally arise[] when the
plaintiff’s trademark is linked to products of shoddy quality, or is
portrayed in an unwholesome or unsavory context likely to evoke
unflattering thoughts about the owner’s product.”94 None of these
courts, however, endeavored to define what constituted
“unwholesome” or “unsavory.” Tarnishment, then, became a
highly subjective, case-specific (and judge-specific) inquiry.95
On the other hand, as Sarah Burstein notes, other courts tried to
eschew dependence on qualitative assessments of tarnishment in
favor of a commercial/noncommercial distinction.96 In L.L. Bean,
Inc. v. Drake Publishers, Inc.,97 the First Circuit turned a First
Amendment lens on the Maine anti-dilution statute. The case
involved a parodic two-page article in the adult magazine High
Society.98 The spoof article was entitled “L.L. Beam’s Back-toSchool Sex Catalogue,” and it featured “a facsimile of Bean’s
trademark . . . and pictures of nude models in sexually explicit
positions using ‘products’ that were described in a crudely

93
One commentator even suggests that some “courts believed sexualization to be a per
se harm leading to dilution by tarnishment.” Leigh A. Hansmann, Comment, Sex, Selling
Power, and Salacious Commentary: Applying the Copyright Fair Use Doctrine in the
Trademark Context, 2008 MICH. ST. L. REV. 843, 864.
94
Deere & Co. v. MTD Prods., Inc., 41 F.3d 39, 43 (2d Cir. 1994) (emphasis added);
see also Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. Balducci Publ’ns, 28 F.3d 769, 777 (8th Cir. 1994)
(“Courts have frequently enjoined the ‘tarnishment’ of a mark through association with
unsavory goods, persons or services.”); Original Appalachian Artworks, Inc. v. Topps
Chewing Gum, Inc., 642 F. Supp. 1031, 1039 (N.D. Ga. 1986) (“[T]arnishment . . .
occurs when a defendant uses the same or similar marks in a way that creates an
undesirable, unwholesome, or unsavory mental association with the plaintiff’s mark.”).
95
See, e.g., Pratheepan Gulasekaram, Policing the Border Between Trademarks and
Free Speech: Protecting Unauthorized Trademark Use in Expressive Works, 80 WASH. L.
REV. 887, 913 (2005) (“[B]y allowing judges to determine the social value to be accorded
to expressive works, courts conduct a standardless exercise in imagination and creativity.
When a court determines liability in cases involving sexuality, obscenity, drug use, or
other ‘unwholesome’ associations, it runs the risk of transforming itself from a guardian
of constitutional mandates into a literary and social critic—a demotion the judiciary is illequipped to handle.”).
96
See Burstein, supra note 40, at 1212.
97
811 F.2d 26 (1st Cir. 1987).
98
Id. at 27.
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humorous fashion.”99 L.L. Bean brought suit for trademark
infringement and dilution, inter alia, and the district court granted
summary judgment on the dilution claim, finding that the
defendant’s article “had tarnished Bean’s trademark by
undermining the goodwill and reputation associated with the
mark.”100 At the outset, the First Circuit rejected the district
court’s reliance on the real property analogy that the Dallas
Cowboys Cheerleaders court had espoused.101 Moreover, the court
distinguished Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders by maintaining that
this case involved an “editorial or artistic” parody, which it
characterized as noncommercial.102 While acknowledging that
“the Constitution tolerates an incidental impact on rights of
expression of commercial actors in order to prevent a defendant
from unauthorizedly merchandising his products with another’s
trademark[,]”103 it emphasized that
If the anti-dilution statute were construed as
permitting a trademark owner to enjoin the use of
his mark in a noncommercial context found to be
negative or offensive, then a corporation could
shield itself from criticism by forbidding the use of
its name in commentaries critical of its conduct . . . .
The Constitution does not . . . permit the range of
the anti-dilution statute to encompass the
unauthorized use of a trademark in a
noncommercial setting such as an editorial or
artistic context.104
Moreover, it viewed the district court’s evaluation of the
speech at issue in the case as “an untoward judicial evaluation of
the offensiveness or unwholesomeness of the appellant’s
materials.”105 It further maintained that “[t]he central role which
trademarks occupy in public discourse (a role eagerly encouraged

99
100
101
102
103
104
105

Id.
Id.
Id. at 29.
Id. at 32.
Id.
Id. at 33.
Id. at 33–34.
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by trademark owners), makes them a natural target of parodists.
Trademark parodies, even when offensive, do convey a
message.”106 Thus, the parody was valuable speech and social
commentary, however offensive.
In sum, the First Circuit seemed to find a subjective assessment
of the parameters of tarnishment itself untenable when it could
instead rely on a commercial/noncommercial distinction. To the
First Circuit, it did not seem to matter if the use of the trademark
was distasteful—everything turned on whether its use was
commercial. Thus, L.L. Bean was much less concerned with the
image that a trademark owner wanted to convey than with speech
protection.
While well-intentioned, the First Circuit’s analysis seemed to
gloss over the fact that Drake’s parody was no less injurious to a
brand image than the uses in Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders or
Milky Way Productions were, and it was somewhat at pains to
distinguish those cases, which it believed were commercial uses,
from L.L. Bean’s noncommercial editorial.107 The court thus did
not clearly define what uses of a trademark would fall under the
rubric of “noncommercial use” and left the determination up to
subjective judicial assessments.
2. Tarnishment Rationales Underlying San Francisco Arts &
Athletics v. United States Olympic Committee and MGMPathe Communications Co. v. Pink Panther Patrol
Around roughly the same time as the L.L. Bean case, two cases
involving the use of trademarks and sexuality were working their
way through the courts.108 Although neither of these cases dealt
explicitly with tarnishment or dilution, a tarnishment rationale
underlies these cases—specifically, the tarnishment of marks by

106

Id. at 34.
Id. at 32–33.
108
See S.F. Arts & Athletics, Inc. v. U.S. Olympic Comm., 483 U.S. 522 (1987);
MGM-Pathe Commc’ns, Co. v. Pink Panther Patrol, 774 F. Supp. 869 (S.D.N.Y. 1991);
see also Int’l Olympic Comm. v. S.F. Arts & Athletics, Inc., 789 F.2d 1319 (9th Cir.
1986) (denial from rehearing en banc).
107
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association with homosexuality.109 While International Olympic
Committee v. San Francisco Arts & Athletics (the “Gay Olympics
case”) relied on the Amateur Sports Act to avoid a trademark’s
association with a group of gay athletes,110 the court in MGMPathe Communications, Co. v. Pink Panther Patrol111 allowed
concerns about tarnishment to inform its likelihood of confusion
analysis, thus enjoining a group committed to the prevention of
violence against gay men and women from using the mark of their
choice.112
In 1986, the Ninth Circuit denied a rehearing en banc for the
Gay Olympics case.113 The case involved a San Francisco nonprofit corporation that sought to use the name “Gay Olympics
Games” for an event it wanted to sponsor that was “designed to
combat homophobia and to work for the health and tolerance of
gay and lesbian persons.”114
The United States Olympic
Committee (the “USOC”) sued San Francisco Arts & Athletics
(the “SFAA”) under a federal statute that gave the USOC “the
exclusive right to use the word Olympic ‘for the purpose of trade,
to induce the sale of any goods or service, or to promote any
theatrical exhibition, athletic performance, or competition.’”115
The Ninth Circuit held for the USOC and upheld an injunction
against the SFAA’s use of “Gay Olympic Games.”116 Dissenting
from the rehearing en banc, Judge Kozinski cautioned that the
result reached by the court “threaten[ed] a potentially serious and
widespread infringement of personal liberties.”117 The SFAA
sought to use the term “Olympic” to evoke a positive and healthy
109
See Sonia Katyal, Performance, Property, and the Slashing of Gender in Fan
Fiction, 14 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 461, 462–63 (2006) (citing the Gay
Olympics case as an example of how “courts have routinely protected the rights of
intellectual property owners to enjoin expressive uses of their works under the argument
that sexualized depictions ‘tarnish’ the wholesomeness of the original”).
110
See Kravitz, supra note 75, at 180 (suggesting that the Gay Olympics case turned on
dilution more than any likelihood of confusion).
111
774 F. Supp. 869 (S.D.N.Y. 1991).
112
See id. at 876.
113
789 F.2d 1319, 1320 (9th Cir. 1986) (denial from rehearing en banc).
114
Id. (Kozinski, J., dissenting).
115
Id. (quoting 36 U.S.C. § 380 (1982)).
116
Id.
117
Id.
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image of gay men and women.118 According to Judge Kozinski,
denying the SFAA the right to use the word “Olympic” deprived
them of an essential “nuance of meaning:”119
The word Olympic was no doubt chosen to foster a
wholesome, normal image of homosexuals.
Denying SFAA use of the word thwarts that
purpose. To say that the SFAA could have named
its event “The Best and Most Accomplished
Amateur Gay Athletes Competition” no more
answers the [F]irst [A]mendment concerns here
than to suggest that Paul Robert Cohen could have
worn a jacket saying “I Strongly Resent the
Draft.”120
Criticizing the majority for treating “the word ‘Olympic’ and
its associated symbols and slogans [as] essentially property,”121
Judge Kozinski expressed concern for the strengthening of
intellectual property rights at the expense of the public domain.122
And then Judge Kozinski hit on the heart of the matter—the
majority supported “an exclusion that is invoked pursuant to a
subjective assessment of the wholesomeness of the proposed
speaker or propriety of the proposed message.”123 Kozinski’s
analysis thus indicates that the Ninth Circuit majority’s concerns
were not grounded in any likelihood of confusion, but rather in the
tarnishment of the Olympic name. As Kozinski noted acerbically,
the “handicapped, juniors, police, Explorers, even dogs are allowed
to carry the Olympic torch, but homosexuals are not.”124
The Supreme Court affirmed the Ninth Circuit’s opinion in
1987.125 Relying on a Lockean conception of the USOC’s
property right,126 the Court determined that the SFAA’s use of the
term was commercial and could thus be reached by section 110 of
118
119
120
121
122
123
124
125
126

Id. at 1321.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1323.
Id.
Id.
S.F. Arts & Athletics, Inc. v. U.S. Olympic Comm., 483 U.S. 522, 528 (1987).
See id. at 532.
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the Amateur Sports Act.127 Justice Powell’s majority opinion
relied not on a likelihood of confusion analysis, but rather, on a
dilution rationale:128 Congress “could determine that unauthorized
uses [of the Olympic words and symbols], even if not confusing,
nevertheless may harm the USOC by lessening the distinctiveness
and thus the commercial value of the marks.”129
In his dissent, Justice Brennan took the majority to task for
upholding a statute that he maintained was unconstitutionally
overbroad—it prohibited noncommercial uses that would have
benefited from First Amendment protection had the Act
incorporated any of the traditional trademark defenses codified in
the Lanham Act.130 Indeed, the Act benefited from “additional
authority to regulate a substantial amount of noncommercial
speech that serves to promote social and political ideas.”131
According to Justice Brennan, “this broad discretion creat[ed] the
potential for significant suppression of protected speech.”132
Furthermore, the Act was not viewpoint neutral—the “Amateur
Sports Act singles out certain . . . groups for favorable treatment”
but not others, including the SFAA.133 Similar to Judge Kozinki’s
view, Justice Brennan’s dissent implied that the injunction on this
use was predicated upon a homophobic tarnishment rationale.
Thus, as Judge Kozinski and Justice Brennan indicated, the
Gay Olympics cases, although not decided under the Lanham Act,
had disturbing consequences for the association of sexual
orientation and trademarks. As Rosemary Coombe asserts,
“Trademark legislation thus enabled a public authority to exercise
127
Id. at 539–41. It is important to underscore that the statute at issue here was not the
Lanham Act, but rather, the Amateur Sports Act, which granted greater rights to the use
of the word “Olympic” than the Lanham Act would have. Nonetheless, the court relied
on trademark principles in its analysis, and the decision has had wide-reaching influence
in trademark law.
128
Indeed, the Court emphasized that “the USOC need not prove that a contested use is
likely to cause confusion, and an unauthorized user of the word does not have available
the normal statutory defenses.” Id. at 531.
129
Id. at 539.
130
Id. at 562 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Statutory trademark defenses are codified at 15
U.S.C. § 1115 (2006).
131
S.F. Arts & Athletics, 483 U.S. at 567 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
132
Id. at 568.
133
Id. at 570.
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its power over a signifier in a discriminatory manner—to prevent
subordination from becoming translated into hegemonic
articulation.”134 This result was inherently problematic because
“SFAA’s speech was speech on behalf of an unpopular minority,
thus more susceptible to being discouraged.”135 Thus, the majority
opinion in the Gay Olympics case prevented gay athletes from
empowering themselves by using a word that evokes the “spirit of
co-operation, mutual acceptance, and international friendship.”136
Moreover, the Supreme Court had (inadvertently?) created
precedent whereby a court could deem a trademark’s association
with sexual orientation tarnishment, and it restricted the free
speech rights of a marginalized group.
A tarnishment rationale similarly underlies the Second
Circuit’s decision in MGM-Pathe Communications, Co. v. Pink
Panther Patrol. The case involved a gay rights group’s use of the
name “The Pink Panther Patrol.”137 The group patrolled the streets
of New York, “with the goals of protecting the gay community and
educating the general public about violence against gays.”138 The
name it chose was a deliberate homage to “other activist
organizations such as the Grey and Black Panthers, changed to
pink because pink is a color associated with gay activism.”139
MGM filed suit to protect its trademark in the movie and popular
cartoon character of the same name,140 alleging trademark
infringement and dilution under New York State’s General
Business Law.141 Although Judge Leval142 granted a preliminary

134

COOMBE, supra note 23, at 137; see also Katya Assaf, The Dilution of Culture and
the Law of Trademarks, 49 IDEA 1, 60 (2008) (“The Olympic Committee should have no
right to make decisions with respect to the cultural meaning of the Olympic Games and,
particularly, on whether or not they should be associated with homosexuals. By allowing
the Olympic Committee to decide this issue, a single private entity is allowed to
determine whether our cultural perception of wholesome and prestigious athletic games
should include the notion of homosexuality.”).
135
Kravitz, supra note 75, at 177.
136
Dreyfuss, supra note 22, at 413.
137
MGM-Pathe Commc’ns, Co. v. Pink Panther Patrol, 774 F. Supp. 869, 871
(S.D.N.Y. 1991).
138
Id.
139
Id.
140
Id. at 872.
141
Id.
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injunction on the basis of likelihood of confusion, stating that he
did not need to consider MGM’s state dilution claim,143
tarnishment concerns pervade his opinion.144
Judge Leval
underscored that “MGM uses its mark to promote an image of
lighthearted, nonpolitical, asexual, amicable, comic entertainment”
whereas “[t]he Patrol’s use of the name is associated with political
activism, violence, defiance, homosexuality and angry
confrontation.”145 Moreover, in weighing the balance of hardships,
Judge Leval was concerned about
the cheapening [of the Pink Panther mark] through
repeated use by others and the likely alteration of
the image associated with the mark that could result
from publicity given to violent attacks and
counterattacks involving the Pink Panther Patrol
[that] could seriously impair the value and
continued usefulness of [MGM’s] mark.146
Pink Panther Patrol is thus another example of sexual
orientation as a tarnishing agent. While Judge Leval’s analysis
ostensibly focuses on likelihood of confusion, it is far from clear
that confusion could have resulted from the gay rights group’s use
of the mark. Indeed, while the marks were the same, the lack of
proximity of the marks in the marketplace and similar marketing
channels strongly indicated that confusion would not result;
moreover, there was no evidence of actual confusion.147 Rather,
dilution by tarnishment seemed to be foremost on Judge Leval’s
mind.
142
The fact that Judge Leval, champion of free speech and fair use, decided this case is
more than a little ironic. See generally Pierre N. Leval, Toward a Fair Use Standard, 103
HARV. L. REV. 1105 (1990) (examining copyright fair use); Pierre N. Leval, Trademark:
Champion of Free Speech, 27 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 187 (2004) [hereinafter Leval,
Trademark].
143
Pink Panther Patrol, 774 F. Supp. at 877.
144
See Burstein, supra note 40, at 1203 (“One court hinted—although it did not
consider or decide—that tarnishment might be found where a defendant’s use of a
famous mark links the senior user’s mark to a contentious political issue where the senior
user ‘has developed [the] mark to suggest ‘carefree, comedic, non-political fun.’’”
(alteration in original) (quoting Pink Panther Patrol, 774 F. Supp. at 871–73)).
145
Pink Panther Patrol, 774 F. Supp. at 876 (emphasis added).
146
Id. at 877.
147
See id. at 874–76.
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Pink Panther Patrol, like the Gay Olympics case, added more
fuel to the fire of tarnishment by association with “gayness,”
notwithstanding the fact that sexual orientation is not synonymous
with “unwholesomeness.” While, as the succeeding sections
demonstrate, courts became more solicitous of free speech
concerns in tarnishment cases, this tarnishment-by-sexuality
rationale eventually found a place in pre-litigation maneuvers by
trademark holders, namely in cease-and-desist letters.
3. Tarnishment Cases Under the FTDA
Following the enactment of the FTDA in 1995, statutory
exemptions and judicial interpretation arguably began to afford
greater protection to sexually connotative uses of marks. In
particular, because the FTDA granted an exemption for
noncommercial uses,148 tarnishment could not reach certain kinds
of speech. While some courts continued to rely on pre-FTDA case
law in attempting to define tarnishing uses,149 the dividing line
between actionable and non-actionable uses moved away from the
content of the use to a consideration of whether it was commercial
or noncommercial.
A series of cases in the Ninth Circuit and its district courts
began to solidify this distinction in the context of sexually explicit
or suggestive uses of marks. For example, in Lucasfilm Ltd. v.
Media Market Group, Ltd.,150 the Northern District of California
relied on the district court’s opinion in Mattel, Inc. v. MCA
Records, Inc.151 in holding that a “pornographic animated film
entitled ‘Starballz’” was not actionable tarnishment under the
FTDA.152 Lucasfilm had sought a preliminary injunction alleging
148

Federal Trademark Dilution Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-98, 109 Stat. 985 (1996),
repealed by Trademark Dilution Revision Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-312, 120 Stat.
730.
149
See, e.g., Hormel Foods Corp. v. Jim Henson Prods., Inc., 73 F.3d 497, 507 (2d Cir.
1996) (“Some cases have found that a mark is tarnished when its likeness is placed in the
context of sexual activity, obscenity, or illegal activity.”); Am. Dairy Queen Corp. v.
New Line Prods., Inc., 35 F. Supp. 2d 727, 733 (D. Minn. 1998) (“[T]arnishment most
frequently occurs when a mark is used in connection with sexually explicit materials . . .
.”).
150
182 F. Supp. 2d 897 (N.D. Cal. 2002).
151
28 F. Supp. 2d 1120 (C.D. Cal. 1998).
152
Media Mkt. Group, 182 F. Supp. 2d at 899–901.
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that the film infringed and diluted its trademarks in “Star Wars.”153
In rejecting Lucasfilm’s claims, the court emphasized that
“[p]arody is a form of non-commercial, protected speech which is
not affected by the [FTDA].”154 While the court’s conclusory
statement on parody lacked nuance somewhat,155 the court seemed
to be emphasizing that an expressive use, though pornographic,
will not rise to the level of actionable tarnishment. The implication
was that courts may enjoin pornographic uses only when they deem
the use commercial. Indeed, the court did agree that “Starballz
tarnishes the Star Wars family of marks by associating them with a
pornographic film that is inconsistent with the image Star Wars has
striven to maintain for itself” but held that this use was simply not
actionable under the FTDA.156
Soon after Media Market Group was decided, the Ninth
Circuit’s decision in Mattel, Inc. v. MCA Records, Inc.157 came
down. Writing for the majority, Judge Kozinski held that the band
Aqua’s use of Mattel’s “Barbie” mark in Aqua’s song and song
title “Barbie Girl” fell under the FTDA’s noncommercial use
exemption.158 Mattel had sued MCA records, Aqua’s label, for
trademark infringement and dilution, alleging that the song harmed
the “Barbie” mark.159 As Judge Kozinski pointed out, “the
song . . . lampoons the Barbie image and comments humorously on
the cultural values Aqua claims she represents.”160 While the song
was not overtly explicit, sexual innuendos abounded. To wit, the
song contained the following lyrics that are at odds with the
squeaky-clean image Mattel strives to maintain for Barbie: “You
can brush my hair, undress me everywhere” and “Kiss me here,
touch me there, hanky-panky.”161 Although the opinion did not
153

Id. at 899.
Id. at 900.
155
A full examination of the scope of parody is beyond this paper. For more on the
contours of trademark parody, see generally Cantwell, supra note 59; Bruce P. Keller &
Rebecca Tushnet, Even More Parodic than the Real Thing: Parody Lawsuits Revisited,
94 TRADEMARK REP. 979 (2004).
156
See Media Mkt. Group, 182 F. Supp. 2d at 900–01.
157
296 F.3d 894 (9th Cir. 2002).
158
Id. at 906–07; see supra note 56 and accompanying text.
159
Id. at 899.
160
Id. at 907.
161
Id. at 909 (app.).
154
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explicitly mention “tarnishment,” it was clear that Mattel found the
song to be offensive. Judge Kozinski held, however, that because
the song did not comprise fully commercial speech, it fell under
the FTDA’s noncommercial use exemption.162 Thus, Judge
Kozinski underscored that the inquiry should not focus on the
offensiveness of the speech itself—rather, he focused on the
commercial/noncommercial fulcrum. Moreover, he arguably
expanded the scope of this exemption. As one commentator notes,
Mattel thus modifies the dichotomy first proposed
in Bean from commercial use versus expressive use
to commercial speech versus noncommercial
speech. Under this reading, “mixed” uses of a
trademark (i.e., uses that combine a commercial
with an expressive purpose) would not be
actionable under the FTDA because they will
always do more than “propose a commercial
transaction.”163
Thus, under MCA, it would seem that pornographic but
expressive uses of a mark could arguably pass muster.
The Ninth Circuit relied on MCA a year later in Mattel, Inc. v.
Walking Mountain Productions.164 Mattel had brought suit against
Thomas Forsythe, an artist who had created the “Food Chain
Barbie” photo series, “in which he depicted Barbie in various
absurd and often sexualized positions.”165 Indeed, Forsythe
display[ed] carefully positioned, nude, and
sometimes frazzled looking Barbies in often
ridiculous and apparently dangerous situations. . . .
In some of [his] photos Barbie is about to be
destroyed or harmed by domestic life in the form of
kitchen appliances, yet continues displaying her
well-known smile, disturbingly oblivious to her
predicament. . . . [He] convey[ed] a sexualized
162
Id. at 906 (“If speech is not ‘purely commercial’—that is, if it does more than
propose a commercial transaction—then it is entitled to full First Amendment
protection.”).
163
Cantwell, supra note 59, at 577.
164
353 F.3d 792 (9th Cir. 2003).
165
Id. at 796.
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perspective of Barbie by showing the nude doll in
sexually suggestive contexts.166
The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s grant of
summary judgment to the defendant on all claims, including
copyright and trademark infringement and dilution.167 In its brief
analysis of dilution, the court relied on MCA for the proposition
that “[p]arody is a form of noncommercial expression if it does
more than propose a commercial transaction.”168 The court
deemed Forsythe’s works parodies, and thus the sexualized
Barbies comprised noncommercial speech.169 As in MCA and
Media Market Group, the court was not swayed by the fact that the
content of Forsythe’s pieces was at odds with the image that Mattel
sought to cultivate or that Mattel viewed the works as damaging to
Barbie’s brand image.
Thus, as Media Market Group, MCA, and Walking Mountain
Productions all demonstrate, courts began to avoid a qualitative
assessment of the speech in favor of a commercial/noncommercial
distinction.170 Thus, speech that associated trademarks with
sexually explicit or suggestive material arguably began to have
more protection than under state dilution statutes. At the same
time, however, some courts continued to find tarnishment in
perhaps nonexpressive uses of marks, particularly with respect to
uses of trademarks in the domain names of pornographic
websites.171 These decisions are not necessarily at odds with MCA,
166

Id. at 802.
Id. at 796.
168
Id. at 812.
169
Id.
170
But see Kraft Food Holdings, Inc. v. Helm, 205 F. Supp. 942, 956 (E.D. Ill. 2002)
(holding that the defendant artist’s use of the nickname “King VelVeeda” on a website
containing pornographic material and drug use would dilute the plaintiff’s “Velveeta”
mark). As Cantwell notes, the court there demonstrated “judicial priggishness” in
refusing to consider application of the FTDA’s noncommercial use exception to this lessthan-tasteful use of the plaintiff’s mark. Cantwell, supra note 59, at 568–69.
171
See, e.g., Mattel, Inc. v. Internet Dimensions, Inc., 55 U.S.P.Q.2d 1620, 1627
(S.D.N.Y. 2000) (holding that the use of “Barbie” mark in “barbiesplaypen.com” site
tarnished Mattel’s mark); Polo Ralph Lauren L.P. v. Schuman, No. Civ.A. H97-1855,
1998 WL 110059, at *2–3 (S.D. Tex. Feb. 9, 1998) (granting permanent injunction
against use of the mark “Polo” in the name of defendant’s “adult entertainment
establishment”); Hasbro, Inc. v. Internet Entm’t Group Ltd., 40 U.S.P.Q.2d 1479, 1480
(W.D. Wash. 1996) (holding that defendant’s use of the “Candy Land” mark in its
167
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however, as they arguably involve purely commercial uses of the
plaintiff’s trademarks.
It is important to underscore that beyond the noncommercial
exemption provided in the FTDA, other courts sought to tighten
the evidentiary requirements for showing dilution.
Most
prominently, in Moseley v. V. Secret Catalogue,172 the Supreme
Court held that the FTDA required “a showing of actual dilution,
rather than a likelihood of dilution.”173 The Supreme Court
refused to presume that the “Victoria’s Secret” mark would be
diluted by a small store in Fort Knox, Kentucky named “Victor’s
Little Secret” that sold sex toys and lingerie.174 It seems that the
Supreme Court did not want to automatically equate what
Victoria’s Secret described as “unwholesome, tawdry
merchandise”175 with actionable dilution under the FTDA. For that
reason, it held that “actual dilution” was required under federal
law.176 Although Congress overruled the decision in Moseley by
enacting the Trademark Dilution Revision Act in 2006,177 the case
still evinces an effort to reign in the potentially broad-reaching
scope of tarnishment and dilution.178

“sexually explicit Internet site, and [use of] the name string ‘www.candyland.com’ as an
Internet domain name” diluted the plaintiff’s mark and granting a preliminary injunction).
172
537 U.S. 418 (2003), remanded to 558 F. Supp. 2d 734 (W.D. Ky. 2008), aff’d 605
F.3d 382 (6th Cir. 2010).
173
Id. at 433.
174
Id. at 423.
175
Id.
176
Id. at 433.
177
Trademark Dilution Revision Act of 2006, 109 Pub. L. No. 109-312, 120 Stat. 1730
(codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1052, 1063–64, 1092, 1125, 1127 (2006)).
178
On remand, however, the Moseley case took a decidedly different turn, seemingly
reviving tarnishment in the courts by holding that the TDRA “creates a kind of rebuttable
presumption, or at least a very strong inference, that a new mark used to sell sex related
products is likely to tarnish a famous mark if there is a clear semantic association
between the two.” V Secret Catalogue, Inc. v. Moseley, 605 F.3d 382, 385 (6th Cir.
2010); see also Matthew D. Marcotte, Dilution Back from the Dead? V Secret v.
Moseley, Visa International v. JSL Corp., and National Pork Board v. Supreme Lobster
and Seafood Co., 80 PAT. TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT J. (BNA) 402 (2010) (arguing that
there may be “a new glimmer of hope for dilution plaintiffs” in the wake of three recent
decisions upholding a likelihood of dilution).
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Thus, as this section has demonstrated, case law under the
FTDA began treating tarnishment claims with greater solicitude for
speech.179
4. Post-TDRA Tarnishment and Sexually Suggestive
Associations
Since the enactment of the TDRA in 2006, very few cases
involving tarnishment and sexuality have been adjudicated. In
Burnett v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp.,180 Carol Burnett
sued Fox for copyright and trademark infringement, dilution,
statutory right of publicity, and common law misappropriation
over a Family Guy episode she deemed offensive.181 In the
episode, “an animated figure resembling the ‘Charwoman’ from
the Carol Burnett Show” was mopping the floor in a porn shop
while a variation of Carol’s Theme from the Carol Burnett show
played in the background.182 The brief Carol Burnett reference
also featured a puerile sexual innuendo involving Carol Burnett’s
father.183 The district court granted the motion to dismiss on all
claims.184 In dismissing the dilution claim, the court held that the
Family Guy episode was “artistic” and “parodic” noncommercial
speech and thus it could not be the subject of a trademark dilution
claim.185 The court did state that it “fully appreciate[d] how
distasteful and offensive the segment [was] to Ms. Burnett,”186 but
it ultimately maintained that “the law, as it must in an open society,
provides broad protection for the defendant’s segment.”187 Thus,
even though the court found Family Guy’s uses of Burnett’s
179
But see Cantwell, supra note 59, at 579 (“Yet it seems likely that post-Mattel case
law will present no less of patchwork than the pre-Mattel case law.”).
180
491 F. Supp. 2d 962 (C.D. Cal. 2007).
181
Id. at 966.
182
Id.
183
See id. (“The scene switches back to Peter and his friends. One of the friends
remarks: ‘You know, when she tugged her ear at the end of that show, she was really
saying goodnight to her mom.’ Another friend responds, ‘I wonder what she tugged to
say goodnight to her dad,’ finishing with a comic’s explanation, ‘Oh!’” (internal citations
omitted)).
184
Id. at 975.
185
Id. at 974.
186
Id.
187
Id. at 975.
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trademarks to be distasteful, it maintained that it could not enjoin
the use on those grounds alone. Although the Burnett case does
not involve overt references to sex and sexuality, it suggests that
post-TDRA courts may continue the trend of broadly interpreting
exemptions from the tarnishment cause of action in the Lanham
Act.188
5. Tarnishment in the Courts Redux: Where Do We Go from
Here?
As the foregoing sections demonstrate, the case law on
tarnishment is a mixed bag, but it does indicate a growing
188

It is worth noting, however, that the recent Sixth Circuit Moseley decision has
created some cause for concern regarding the automatic linkage between tarnishment and
sex/sexuality. See V Secret Catalogue, Inc. v. Moseley, 605 F.3d 382, 387–88 (6th Cir.
2010) (“There appears to be a clearly emerging consensus in the case law . . . that the
creation of an ‘association’ between a famous mark and lewd or bawdy sexual activity
disparages and defiles the famous mark and reduces the commercial value of its selling
power. This consensus stems from an economic prediction about consumer taste and
how the predicted reaction of conventional consumers in our culture will affect the
economic value of the famous mark.”); id. at 389 (“Thus, any new mark with a lewd or
offensive-to-some sexual association raises a strong inference of tarnishment. The
inference must be overcome by evidence that rebuts the probability that some consumers
will find the new mark both offensive and harmful to the reputation and the favorable
symbolism of the famous mark.”); Paul Alan Levy, What Dilution by Tarnishment Is
Really About, PUB. CITIZEN CONSUMER L. & POL’Y BLOG (May 20, 2010, 3:02 PM),
http://pubcit.typepad.com/clpblog/2010/05/what-dilution-by-tarnishment-is-reallyabout.html (criticizing the outcome of the case and the disingenuity of its reasoning by
noting that Victoria’s Secret’s “products are sexy lingerie and the like; and its real
product is sexual connotation”—in sum, it is difficult to “tarnish” already sexed up
goods); J. Thomas McCarthy, A First Look by Tom McCarthy at the Sixth Circuit’s 2010
Victoria’s Secret Tarnishment Decision, ERIC GOLDMAN—TECH. & MARKETING L. BLOG
(May 24, 2010, 9:07 PM), http://blog.ericgoldman.org/archives/2010/05/a_first_look
_by.htm (“The decision also raises troubling issues of commercial speech. The majority
creates a presumption of dilution by tarnishment if the junior mark appears on ‘sexrelated products,’ invoking the tort doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. This sounds like the
court is making value judgments about what is ‘sexy.’ As dissenting [J]udge Moore
points out, it’s ironic that the ‘tarnished’ plaintiff’s VICTORIA’S SECRET mark itself is
widely promoted as a source for ‘sexy little things’ intimate lingerie.”). Further exegesis
on the Moseley decision is beyond the scope of this Note; it is important, though, to
underscore its possible implications for tarnishment law, even though it is arguably
premised on a misunderstanding of tarnishment and the recent trends in case law. At the
same time, Moseley may be distinguished from noncommercial speech cases because of
the defendants’ use of their mark as a source signifier and the commercial nature of their
use (for an adult-themed store offering sex toys and other sexually-themed objects).
Moseley, 605 F.3d at 384.
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solicitude for broadly interpreting the federal statute to exempt
many, if not all, types of expressive speech. As Professor
McGeveran notes, “the results of reported cases involving
expressive uses . . . have stabilized in the last decade and now
favor the expressive uses most of the time.”189
At the same time, dilution law in general seems to be becoming
less successful in the courts and “[j]udicial enthusiasm for dilution
as a theory of infringement has diminished.”190 As Professor Long
notes,
Judicial enforcement of dilution law is not robust
today and has been eroding over time. . . . [R]elief
rates have been on a downward trajectory since
then. It could well be the case that dilution law is a
powerful bargaining chip in cease-and-desist letters
and in negotiations entirely outside the litigatory
arena. In the federal courts, however, dilution cases
are not exactly a juggernaut. That is not to say that
dilution law lacks seductive appeal, but rather that
is seems not to have worked its wiles on the judicial
mind as many feared.191
Long’s research demonstrates that, under FTDA reported
cases, “the rate at which trademark holders have been able to get
injunctive relief on their dilution claims in district court has been
dropping over time from an initial success rate of 54.17% in 1996
to 12.00% for the first half of 2005.”192 Similarly, in unreported
filings, relief rates dropped from 45.45% in 1999 to 14.81% in the
first half of 2005.193 Professor Barton Beebe further argues that
there is “strong and disturbing evidence of the continuing debacle
of U.S. antidilution law and of the failure of the TDRA so far to
effect any substantial change in course.”194 Moreover, “the case
189

McGeveran, Rethinking, supra note 31, at 59. Professor McGeveran defines
“expressive uses” as those “uses of trademarks [that] convey an articulable message
rather than, or in addition to, the traditional function of source identification.” Id. at 54.
190
Long, supra note 28, at 1054.
191
Id. at 1031.
192
Id. at 1042 (including domain name cases).
193
Id. at 1050 (including domain name cases).
194
Beebe, supra note 30, at 450.
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law shows the remarkable extent to which courts continue to treat
the dilution cause of action as redundant of—and, thus, made
superfluous by—the infringement cause of action.”195
At first blush, it would seem that dilution in general, and
tarnishment in particular, is losing its salience in trademark law.
However, as Part II will demonstrate, it is likely that dilution by
tarnishment plays an increasing role in pre-litigation
correspondence, namely cease-and-desist letters. Moreover, the
early attitudes towards uses of trademarks in either sexually
explicit contexts or with reference to sexual orientation still seem
to inform trademark owners’ actions in the cease-and-desist
context.
II. BRANDS AS VEHICLES OF SPEECH: HOW CEASE-AND-DESIST
LETTERS MAY CHILL DEPICTIONS AND SUGGESTIONS OF SEXUALITY
As Part I discussed, tarnishment’s scope in adjudications has
largely been cabined by statutory provisions and judicial fiat. As
this Part will suggest, tarnishment allegations still can thrive in the
plethora of cease-and-desist letters that mark owners send on a
routine basis. This Part will begin by emphasizing the distinction
between sex and sexuality in trademark recodings. It will also
briefly survey the examples of cease-and-desist letters that
potential trademark recoders196 and parodists have received. It will
then examine how cease-and-desist letters chill speech and
examine why this silencing is troublesome. This Part will further
examine how, notwithstanding, First Amendment,197 statutory (the
195

Id. In Beebe’s survey of cases decided since the effective date of the TDRA on
October 6, 2006, he found “that of the twenty-six opinions that found no infringement,
none found dilution. Of the fifteen opinions that found infringement, fourteen also found
dilution, yet none of these fourteen findings of dilution resulted in remedies not already
triggered by the court’s finding of infringement.” Id. at 450–51.
196
According to Rosemary Coombe, recoding is “productive activity in which people
engage in meaning-making to adapt signs, texts, and images to their own agendas.”
COOMBE, supra note 23, at 57.
197
While I use the First Amendment here as shorthand for speech considerations, it is
important to underscore that the doctrine of constitutional avoidance is well-embedded in
trademark law. As Professor McGeveran notes, it would be undesirable to “invite First
Amendment balancing into the workaday functioning of trademark cases” because
“judges should avoid unnecessary constitutional decision-making.” William McGeveran,
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TDRA exemptions), and case law (the commercial/
noncommercial distinctions drawn by courts) protections, these
doctrines do not provide adequate safeguards for recoders. In the
context of speech referencing sexuality and sexual orientation, a
main concern is the silencing of a minority group’s views through
the functional equivalent of a prior restraint on speech. For uses of
a trademark in a sexually explicit setting, this is also a concern, as
these uses are never formally deemed obscene under current legal
standards. Moreover, this Part will also touch on the practical
implications for the average individual receiving a cease-and-desist
letter.
A. Distinctions Between “Sex” and “Sexuality” in Disputed
Trademark Uses
Before this Note embarks on a more detailed examination of
recent cease-and-desist recipients, it is important to underscore, in
light of the decisions surveyed in Part I supra, that there is a
distinction between sexually explicit depictions of trademarks and
those that reference sexuality and sexual orientation. On the one
hand, sexually explicit depictions include those that are obscene,
pornographic, prurient, or sexually suggestive in nature, such as in
Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders, L.L. Bean, and Milky Way
Productions.198 These depictions, while tacky and distasteful
(depending on whom you ask), should generally be protected under
the TDRA and existing tarnishment precedent if they fall under
MCA’s rubric of “noncommercial.”199 At the same time, speech
issues aside, one cannot entirely fault trademark owners for being
concerned about associations with sexually explicit content,200
Four Free Speech Goals for Trademark Law, 18 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT.
L.J. 1205, 1212 (2008) [hereinafter McGeveran, Four Free Speech Goals].
198
See supra Part I.B.1.
199
See, e.g., Burnett v. Twentieth Century Fox Film, 491 F. Supp. 2d 962 (C.D. Cal.
2007) (“A dilution action only applies to purely commercial speech.” (citing Mattel, Inc.
v. MCA Records, Inc., 296 F.3d 894, 904 (9th Cir. 2002))).
200
See K.J. Greene, Abusive Trademark Litigation and the Incredible Shrinking
Confusion Doctrine—Trademark Abuse in the Context of Entertainment Media and
Cyberspace, 27 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 609, 634 (2004) (“Although trademark law
should generally not chill artistic expression, it should prevent free-riding and egregious
tarnishment (such as pornographic use) when the trademark holder’s reputation will
suffer tangible harm. For example, in Dallas Cowboys Cheerleader Inc. v. Pussy Cinema
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especially if the marks are child-oriented.201 Indeed, in examining
recoding in copyright and trademark law, Professor Justin Hughes
sees a distinction between trademarks that are “adult” by nature as
opposed to those that are child-oriented:
A further distinction might be drawn between, on
the one hand, lewd recodings of Mickey Mouse and,
on the other hand, the breast-exposed
excheerleaders of the Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders
parody poster. After all, the Dallas Cowboys
Cheerleaders have always traded on sex—that is
what their appeal is supposed to be. Any Dallas
Cowboys corporate-speak about the Cheerleaders
maintaining an image of purity would surely be
tongue-in-cheek capitalism. When some of the
Cheerleader alumni are seen topless, it really does
not seem to “contaminate” the existing cultural
object much. Mickey Mouse shooting up heroin
puts a lot more stress on our communal image of
Mickey Mouse than seeing a Dallas Cowboys
Cheerleader topless puts on our communal image of
the Cheerleaders.202
Thus, it would seem that potential degradation of more
“wholesome” marks is arguably more objectionable or offensive.
On the other hand, when groups like the Courage Campaign
and SFAA seek to use marks in expressive ways, they are
associating marks with sexual orientation, not sex per se.203 These

Ltd., a pornographic filmmaker’s expressive right to use of Dallas Cowboy-style
cheerleader outfits in a film was found to be outweighed by the trademark owner’s rights
to the wholesome image of the cheerleaders.”).
201
See infra Part II.B.3 (discussing sexually explicit Harry Potter fan fiction).
202
Justin Hughes, “Recoding” Intellectual Property and Overlooked Audience
Interests, 77 TEX. L. REV. 923, 985 (1999) (footnote omitted) (referencing Walt Disney
Prods. v. Air Pirates, 581 F.2d 751 (9th Cir. 1978)); see also V Secret Catalogue, Inc. v.
Moseley, 605 F.3d 382, 394 n.4 (6th Cir. 2010) (Moore, J., dissenting) (“Nor can the
court ignore the character of the senior mark when applying the majority’s ‘rule.’
Victoria’s Secret sells women’s lingerie, and, as Victoria’s Secret readily admits, its own
mark is already associated with sex, albeit not with sex novelties.”); Levy, supra note 188
(discussing the irony of the Moseley majority opinion).
203
See supra Part I.
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uses are not prurient in nature—rather, they seek to express core
identity.204 Decisions like Gay Olympics and Pink Panther Patrol,
however, have seemingly conflated “sexual orientation” with
unwholesomeness or unseemliness.205
This is inherently
problematic, because, Part II.C demonstrates, there is a lot at stake
in this arena.206 When such recoders receive cease-and-desist
letters, they may capitulate and self-censor their speech, even when
it is legally unobjectionable.
B. Colorful Illustrations of the Cease-and-Desist Conundrum
Justin Watt and the Courage Campaign, our protagonists from
the introduction, are certainly not alone in their struggles with
trademark owners less than amused by reinterpretations of their
marks. The following are anecdotes of expressions of sexuality or
sexually connotative uses that trademark owners have sought to
silence.
1. Archie Grows Up, Comes Out, and Archie Comics Doesn’t
Like It
In April 2003, an Atlanta-based theatre group, Dad’s Garage
Theatre, received a cease-and-desist letter claiming that the play it
was about to open, “Archie’s Weird Fantasy,” infringed on the
copyrights and trademarks Archie Comics held in its characters.207
The play portrayed Archie and his pals “growing up, coming out
and facing censorship.”208 According to the play’s artistic director,
Sean Daniels, “Archie Comics thought if Archie was portrayed as
being gay, that would dilute and tarnish his image.”209 The letter
further pointed out seven alleged copyright infringements in the
script that would each cost $150,000 in damages.210 Concerned
that the play would not qualify under a parody exception to federal
204

See infra Part II.C.
See supra Part I.B.2.
206
See infra Part II.C.
207
Curt Holman, Fallen Archies: Dad’s Garage Told to Cease and Desist Archie
Satire, CREATIVE LOAFING (Apr. 9, 2003), http://atlanta.creativeloafing.com/gyrobase/
Content?oid=oid:11826.
208
Id.
209
Id.
210
Id.
205
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copyright and trademark law, Daniels decided to change the title of
the play to “Weird Comic Book Fantasy.”211 However, the play’s
author, Roberto Aguirre-Sacasa, apparently did not cede further
ground to Archie Comics, and his tenacity paid off—in 2005, the
play, re-dubbed “The Golden Age” premiered on a New York
stage and garnered a favorable New York Times review.212
As this example illustrates, this referencing of the Archie
characters had no salacious content nor any malicious intent.
Rather, it was one author’s recoding of cultural icons. Archie
Comics took exception to this recoding not because of any
confusion-based rationale, but rather on the grounds that a gay
reinvention of Archie would ruin the comic book character’s
cherished (heterosexual) image. Had Archie Comics succeeded in
suppressing this speech, though, it would have done so on perhaps
purely erroneous dilution grounds—the use clearly would have
fallen under MCA’s rubric of noncommercial speech, as it does
much more than propose a commercial transaction. It would thus
qualify for a statutory exemption under dilution law.213
2. DC Comics Puts a Damper on Batman and Robin’s
Relationship
DC Comics, owner of the trademark rights to Batman and
Robin, was not amused when it discovered artist Mark
Chamberlain’s conceptualization of Batman and Robin’s
relationship in August of 2005.214 Chamberlain’s paintings
showed Batman and Robin in various stages of undress and in
amorous embraces.215 DC Comics sent a cease-and-desist letter to
the owner of the gallery where the works were on display.216 Not
211

Comic Book Legends Revealed #192, CBR, http://goodcomics.comicbookresources.
com/2009/01/29/comic-book-legends-revealed-192 (last visited Apr. 20, 2010).
212
Id.; see also Neil Genzlinger, A Family Just Like Archie, Jughead and Their Pals,
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 9, 2005, at B15, available at http://theater.nytimes.com/2005/
04/09/theater/reviews/09krai.html?_r=2&scp=2&sq=archie%20jughead&st=cse.
213
See supra note 57 and accompanying text; Part I.B.3–4.
214
See Gallery Told to Drop “Gay” Batman, BBC NEWS, Aug. 19, 2005,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/entertainment/4167032.stm.
215
To access images of these paintings, see Mark Chamberlain, ARTNET, http://www.
artnet.com/artist/424157172/mark-chamberlain.html (last visited Apr. 19, 2010).
216
Artnet News, ARTNET (Aug. 18, 2005), http://www.artnet.com/magazineus/
news/artnetnews/artnetnews8-18-05.asp.
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only did it seek to stop the exhibition, it also demanded that the
owner of the gallery “hand over all unsold work.”217 It is very
likely that DC Comics was not just asserting its trademark and
copyright rights in sending the letter; tarnishment of Batman’s
virile heterosexual image was no doubt at issue here. As the
images are still available on Artnet’s site,218 it seems that
Chamberlain did not fully accede to DC Comics’ demands.
Nonetheless, this example is distressing because DC Comics not
only sought to prevent public display of Chamberlain’s artistic
speech, it also sought to confiscate the artist’s physical property.
Most importantly, the trademark basis for those asserted rights was
weak at best because Chamberlain had used the iconic characters
in an expressive work that was not purely, if at all, commercial.
3. Honorable Mention: Other Cease-and-Desist Tarnishment
Highlights
Another notable example of cease-and-desist “‘gorilla-chest
thumping’”219 occurred in 2008 when counsel for the United States
Olympic Committee sent a letter to a gay mens group, the
“Northwest Bears,” who had used the name Kamp Kodiak 2008
“Olympic Village” for its annual summer campout.220 As noted in
USOC’s letter, the Amateur Sports Act allows the Olympic
Committee to preempt any commercial uses of its mark that it has
not licensed.221 The Northwest Bears event, however, was a
noncommercial, not-for-profit gathering,222 which, even under the
Gay Olympics case, might not have fallen under the Amateur

217

Gallery Told to Drop “Gay” Batman, supra note 214.
See Mark Chamberlain, supra note 215.
219
McGeveran, Rethinking, supra note 31, at 64 (quoting Frequently Asked Questions,
CHILLING EFFECTS CLEARINGHOUSE, http://www.chillingeffects.org/question.cgi?
QuestionID=250 (last visited Apr. 19, 2010)).
220
Meegbear, U.S. Olympic Committee Targets the Northwest’s Large, Hairy Gay Men,
DEMOCRATIC UNDERGROUND.COM (July 24, 2008, 8:20 AM), http://www.democratic
underground.com/discuss/duboard.php?az=view_all&address=221x80234
(displaying
correspondence with Carol Gross from the United States Olympic Committee).
221
Id.; see 36 U.S.C. § 220506 (2006).
222
Meegbear, supra note 220.
218
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Sports Act’s prohibitions.223 Nonetheless, the Northwest Bears
capitulated, though one member noted that he was from the
Olympic Peninsula of Washington State and many organizations
from his home region used the term “Olympic.”224 Thus, USOC
succeeded in silencing speech that was noncommercial and
referenced not only the Olympic Games, but also the Northwest
Bears’ geographic home.
Cease-and-desist letters are also common in the fan fiction
arena.225
Fan fiction involves the “widespread and active
appropriation of given texts, plots, and characters” in which fans
“recontextualize” and expand upon films, TV shows, and
fiction.226 Often these recontextualizations involve “graphic sexual
activity.”227 Fan fiction works, while often posted on the Internet,
are not written for profit,228 but the fact that they have no
pecuniary benefit has not stopped trademark and copyright holders
from objecting, often on tarnishment grounds.229 The Chilling
Effects Clearinghouse features one such cease-and-desist letter
sent to a Harry Potter fan fiction writer.230 The letter, sent by J.K.
Rowling’s attorneys in London, expresses concern over the
“integrity” of Rowling’s intellectual property rights in Harry Potter
and scolds the recipient for making such “sexually explicit”
223

See S.F. Arts & Athletics, Inc. v. U.S. Olympic Comm., 483 U.S. 522, 537 n.15
(1987) (“[T]he extent to which the Act may be read to apply to noncommercial speech is
limited.”).
224
Meegbear, supra note 220.
225
A detailed analysis of the legal and sociological intricacies of fan fiction are beyond
the scope of this paper. For a more detailed analysis, see generally COOMBE, supra note
23, at 117–29; Katyal, supra note 109; Rebecca Tushnet, Copyright, Fan Fiction, and a
New Common Law, 17 LOY. L.A. ENT. L.J. 651 (1997).
226
Katyal, supra note 109, at 483.
227
See id. at 483–89 (describing “slash” fiction).
228
See COOMBE, supra note 23, at 118.
229
See Christopher Noxon, When Harry Met Smutty, METRO (June 26–July 2, 2003),
http://www.metroactive.com/papers/metro/06.26.03/potter-0326.html.
Furthermore,
Professor Sonia Katyal highlights that in the slash fan fiction cease-and-desist arena,
where content involves same-sex relationships, another difficulty that arises is that “it is
hard to separate out whether the objectionable content is considered to be problematic
because of its graphic sexual content or because of the same-sex narrative that it offers.”
Katyal, supra note 109, at 513.
230
See Harry Potter Adult Fan Fiction, CHILLING EFFECTS CLEARINGHOUSE,
http://www.chillingeffects.org/fanfic/notice.cgi?NoticeID=534 (last visited Apr. 19,
2010).
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material available for all to see on his website. While Rowling’s
counsel deems the work “sexually explicit,” it is important to note
that there was no judicial determination that it was obscene, nor
that it was done for a purely commercial purpose. Rather, Rowling
seems to be the ultimate arbiter here in what is legally
objectionable in the fan fiction work.
C. Why the Stakes Are High in Cease-and-Desist Scenarios
The stakes are high for people seeking to recode, parody, or
simply reference parts of marks in noncommercial speech. If they
do not cease their allegedly infringing/diluting behavior, they risk
an extended court battle. And if they accede to the demands of the
mark holder, they allow speech to be chilled, “even when the
complained-of expressive uses are almost certainly legal under the
substance of current legal doctrine.”231 As Professor McGeveran
emphasizes, “Considerable anecdotal evidence suggests that the
real action occurs outside the courthouse: markholders send ceaseand-desist letters and threaten legal action against those using
trademarks to facilitate speech, and the recipients frequently
capitulate.”232 Admittedly, it is difficult to calculate the ratio of
speech silenced to cease-and-desist letters sent each year.233
Scholars, however, agree that fear of litigation is a formidable
chilling agent against speech.234 This is problematic in several
major ways: one, speech is chilled for marginalized groups who
seek to use trademarks in expressive ways; two, existing
constitutional, statutory, and judge-made safeguards are too
malleable and unpredictable to protect recoders ex ante; and three,
cease-and-desist letters act as a form of prior restraint that restricts
speech before it can even get to the courthouse.

231

McGeveran, Rethinking, supra note 31, at 64.
McGeveran, Four Free Speech Goals, supra note 197, at 1206–07; see also Beebe,
supra note 30, at 458 n.36.
233
See William E. Ridgway, Note, Revitalizing the Doctrine of Trademark Misuse, 21
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1547, 1577 (2006) (noting that an accurate assessment of all ceaseand-desist claims is difficult, as individuals “likely [to] know their legal rights better than
the average internet user” are the ones posting cease-and-desist letters to the Chilling
Effects Clearinghouse).
234
See, e.g., McGeveran, Rethinking, supra note 31, at 52; Ramsay, supra note 29, at
405.
232
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1. How Cease-and-Desist Letters Silence Marginalized
Recoders
One concern regarding the increasing pervasiveness of ceaseand-desist letters, especially in the context of marks referencing
sexual orientation, is the ability to silence marginalized groups. As
Rosemary Coombe expresses, individuals use trademark logos and
other media imagery to “creat[e] new meanings for [the
trademarks] by putting them in new contexts or juxtaposing them
with other texts that convey[] hidden subtexts.”235 This is
important, sociologically speaking, because individuals in our
society benefit from a dialogic relationship with culture.236
Coombe emphasizes:
If what is quintessentially human is the capacity to
make meaning, challenge meaning, and transform
meaning, then we strip ourselves of our humanity
through overzealous application and continuous
expansion of intellectual property protections.
Dialogue involves reciprocity in communication:
the ability to respond to a sign with signs. What
meaning does dialogue have when we are
bombarded with messages to which we cannot
respond, signs and images whose significations
cannot be challenged, and connotations we cannot
contest?237
Marginalized groups use trademarks expressively to engage in
this dialogue and “in their struggles for recognition and voice.”238
As the discussion supra Part I of the Gay Olympics case and Pink
Panther Patrol indicates,239 the defendants in those cases sought to
use the trademarks at issue to empower gay men and women and to
challenge their status as a marginalized group. SFAA and the Pink
Panther Patrol both sought to use language to invoke positive
images of themselves. Allowing tarnishment rationales to block
such uses contravened basic First Amendment principles: “This
235
236
237
238
239

COOMBE, supra note 23, at 73.
See id. at 82–87.
Id. at 84–85.
Id. at 130.
See supra Part I.B.2.
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type of political advocacy on behalf of an unpopular minority has
long been at the core of the [F]irst [A]mendment’s protections.”240
Groups like SFAA and the Courage Campaign are asserting
important political views implicating individual rights and
liberties; as such, trademark law should not unduly censor such
speech. Indeed, it seems perverse that a brand image would take
priority over a group’s desire and need to express itself and to
engage in political speech.
Even worse, in the cease-and-desist context, such speech often
never gets to the point of formal adjudication. Even though the
examples illustrated above of Justin Watt, the Courage Campaign,
and “Archie’s Weird Fantasy” indicate that speakers sometimes do
fight back against trademark owners, these examples are the
outliers. This is because speakers lack the legal know-how and
funds to pursue their claims more fully.241 A more likely scenario
is that of the Northwest Bears, who simply sought to use the word
“Olympic” as the name for an annual not-for-profit social
gathering; they were firmly rebuked for doing so and then
capitulated to the USOC’s demands.242 Given the pervasiveness of
cease-and-desist letters, it is likely that those who seek to imbue
brands with their own interpretations in art, music, literature, and
film may simply not do so for fear of an imminent cease-and-desist
letter.
2. Malleable Doctrinal Safeguards Create Uncertainty
As this Note has examined supra Part I, case law has become
increasingly more favorable to defendants in tarnishment causes of
At the same time, the doctrinal, statutory, and
action.243
constitutional protections that defendants may rely on are,

240

Kravitz, supra note 75, at 179.
See infra Part II.B.3.
242
See supra Part II.A.3.
243
See supra Part I.B. In 2010, however, it seems that dilution law, including
tarnishment, may be enjoying a resurgence in the courts. See, e.g., V Secret Catalogue,
Inc. v. Moseley, 605 F.3d 382 (6th Cir. 2010); supra notes 178, 188.
241
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nonetheless, often malleable and unpredictable.244 As a result,
would-be defendants may become risk-averse and self-censor.245
Take parody. Parody is ostensibly protected under the
TRDA.246 But ever since Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc.’s247
distinction between parody and satire,248 what constitutes parody
has been the subject of much debate.249 As Bruce Keller and
Rebecca Tushnet note, “‘parody’ is just as subject to manipulation
by clever parties or courts in trademark as in copyright.”250
Indeed, often the successfulness of the parody turns on whether the
judge and jury get the joke,251 which can depend on certain socioeconomic and/or cultural differences between judges and
recoders.252 Such contingencies do not offer strong assurances to
the recipient of a cease-and-desist letter that her use is a protected
one.
Furthermore, the language of the TDRA’s exemptions itself
does not provide protections on which would-be recoders can

244
This section briefly examines problems with the “protections” of the TDRA; it does
not purport to exhaust the subject.
245
See McGeveran, Rethinking, supra note 31, at 111.
246
See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(3) (2006).
247
510 U.S. 569 (1994). Although Campbell is a copyright case, it has become
common for courts to use its parody guidelines in trademark disputes. See, e.g., Mattel,
Inc. v. MCA Records, Inc., 296 F.3d 894, 901 (9th Cir. 2002).
248
See Campbell, 510 U.S. at 580–81 (“Parody needs to mimic an original to make its
point, and so has some claim to use the creation of its victim’s (or collective victims’)
imagination, whereas satire can stand on its own two feet and so requires justification for
the very act of borrowing.”).
249
See, e.g., Keller & Tushnet, supra note 155, at 979 (“[T]he distinction between
parody and satire is too fine for courts (not generally recognized as great connoisseurs of
humor) to make.”); id. at 990 (“[T]he distinction between parody and satire is in the eye
of the presiding judge.”).
250
Id. at 1002–03.
251
See, e.g., Gulasekaram, supra note 95, at 911.
252
See Assaf, supra note 134, at 70 (“As the cases above show, it is hard to predict
which expressions will be protected as parodies and which will be regarded as a pointless
tarnishment. Apart from legal uncertainty, this issue also has anti-democratic effects on
cultural discourse. The reason why some expressions do not amuse certain judges—but
seem vulgar, tasteless or depraved to them—is that the judges belong to a different social
group than the target audience of such expressions. Courts exert what Pierre Bourdieu
calls ‘symbolic violence’ by privileging the speech that appeals to them. Judges,
belonging to the cultural elite, silence the voices of other classes by condemning their
aesthetic judgments.” (footnote omitted)).

C04_RSG_10-24-10_FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

2010]

10/24/2010 12:36 PM

CEASE-AND-DESIST: TARNISHMENT’S BLUNT SWORD

1287

comfortably rely. The TDRA “needlessly muddies the law’s
clarity” 253 by only exempting uses “‘other than as a designation of
source.’”254 Like parody, this standard is subject to manipulation
by parties and judges. For example, in the parody at issue in the
Courage Campaign’s dispute with ProtectMarriage.com,
ProtectMarriage.com would argue that the Courage Campaign used
the altered ProtectMarriage logo as a trademark to denote source,
and thus its use could not be protected under the TDRA’s parody
exemption. The Courage Campaign, in turn, would argue that the
use at issue was not a designation of source; rather, it was a
deliberate political message completely unrelated to commercial
concerns. While the Courage Campaign could have a solid
argument, once again, the interpretation of this provision is too
unpredictable to afford much certainty, even for the most
sophisticated of parties.
An overarching concern when considering the malleability of
doctrinal protections is that the exemptions rely on judges’ and
juries’ sensibilities and their notions of propriety. As Professor
Ramsay underscores
If the plaintiff’s mark is a well-known brand and the
defendant is sleazy or the message incorporating the
mark is distasteful, the judge or jury may rule for
the plaintiff despite its speech-harmful trademark
claims. For example, courts punished and enjoined
further use of the Dallas Cowboys Cheerleader’s
trademarked outfits in a pornographic film and use
of the Coca-Cola marks and logos in a poster with
the phrase “Enjoy Cocaine.” A fact-finder may
deem a certain trademark distinctive or a certain use
of a trademark confusing, diluting, or commercial
because he or she dislikes the defendant or its
expression.255
Thus, inevitably, standards like these “invite judges and juries
to evaluate the content of the speech, and . . . the vagueness of the
253
254
255

McGeveran, Rethinking, supra note 31, at 107.
Id. (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(3) (2006)).
Ramsay, supra note 29, at 449.
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rules may cause even well-intentioned factfinders to be
subconsciously swayed by the viewpoint and subject matter of the
speech.”256 Moreover, the case law, while increasingly more
favorable to expressive uses of all stripes, still evinces
contradictions regarding what uses are legally objectionable and
what are not.257
Ultimately, one must ask what good
constitutional, statutory, and case law protections are when they
are dependent, above all, on subjective notions of propriety and
personal taste.
3. Cease-and-Desists: A Private Action Prior Restraint?
It is clear, then, that the threat of a looming cease-and-desist
letter often chills speech and that existing doctrinal protections do
not lessen this chilling effect. From a legal perspective, this
chilling effect is especially problematic because a cease-and-desist
letter acts as the private action equivalent of a prior restraint.
Under established First Amendment jurisprudence, prior restraints
are disfavored by judges and are presumptively invalid.258
A comparison of cease-and-desist letters and preliminary
injunctions is instructive in this context. In examining the
problematic relationship between preliminary injunctions in
intellectual property cases and prior restraints, Professors Mark
Lemley and Eugene Volokh emphasize that “preliminary
injunctions restraining speech are generally considered
unconstitutional ‘prior restraints.’”259 They further note that
although libel and obscenity law are “constitutionally valid
restrictions on speech . . . courts refuse to allow preliminary
injunctions there.”260 This is because courts must make a final
determination as to whether allegedly libelous or obscene speech is

256

Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech and Intellectual Property: Some Thoughts After
Eldred, 44 Liquormart, and Bartnicki, 40 HOUS. L. REV. 697, 710 (2003). Volokh argues
that intellectual property rules are thus content-based, and should be treated as such. Id.
257
See Gulasekaram, supra note 95, at 914 (comparing the outcomes in L.L. Bean,
Milky Way Productions, and Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders).
258
See Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931).
259
Mark A. Lemley & Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech and Injunctions in
Intellectual Property Cases, 48 DUKE L.J. 147, 169 (1998).
260
Id. at 150.
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constitutionally protected.261 Lemley and Volokh then question
the propriety of allowing such restraints in intellectual property
cases. For example, in the trademark context, plaintiffs may obtain
preliminary injunctions before a “court can make a full
determination on the merits that the speech is infringing.”262
While Lemley and Volokh generally maintain that prior restraints
against commercial speech that will likely lead to consumer
confusion are appropriate, they caution that “a preliminary
injunction against [noncommercial] speech seems to . . . be an
unlawful prior restraint.”263 They emphasize that “[o]ne certainly
couldn’t get a preliminary injunction against the publication of a
book on the grounds that the contents of the book might eventually
be demonstrated at trial to be false or even libelous and therefore
constitutionally unprotected.”264 Similarly, trademark cases are
“highly fact-specific [in] nature,” which highlights the importance
of a full trial on the merits of the case.265 Courts simply do not
provide this level of inquiry at the preliminary injunction phase.
Thus, Lemley and Volokh’s analysis underscores that allowing
prior restraints in the form of preliminary injunctions in dilution
cases is incongruous with the greater solicitude that courts give to
speech in libel and obscenity cases.
By extension, the restraints that cease-and-desist letters place
on speech are even more concerning especially when “the
complained-of expressive uses are almost certainly legal under the
substance of current legal doctrine.”266 With cease-and-desist
letters, there are no substantive or procedural protections at all
whatsoever, unlike in a judicial determination for a preliminary
injunction, where a court must generally determine “(1) a
combination of probable success on the merits and the possibility
of irreparable harm, or (2) that there exist serious questions
regarding the merits and the balance of hardships that tip in

261
262
263
264
265
266

See id. at 180.
Id. at 222.
Id. at 224.
Id. at 222.
Id.
McGeveran, Rethinking, supra note 31, at 64.
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[plaintiff’s] favor.”267 Thus, even judicial determinations of
preliminary injunctions, themselves inherently problematic as prior
restraints, afford more speech protection than cease-and-desist
letters do.
Because they act as private action prior restraints, cease-anddesist letters can even be problematic in the context of sexually
explicit uses of a trademark (for example, when a trademark is
used in a pornographic film, as in Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders268
and Media Market Group).269 A comparison to obscenity law is
instructive here. As Lemley and Volokh emphasize, the Supreme
Court has held that prior restraints on films not “‘finally
adjudicated to be obscene’” were unconstitutional.270 It is
troubling, therefore, that sexually explicit uses of a trademark are
subject to much less protection in the pre-litigation and preliminary
injunction context than allegedly obscene materials are.271 In this
way, cease-and-desist letters can circumvent not only dilution
requirements under the TDRA, but also entrenched First
Amendment principles.
4. Other Impediments Associated with the Cease-and-Desist
Letter
Not only do cease-and-desist letters often run contrary to
established legal principles, they also rely on a likelihood that the
recipient will be unsophisticated and lack the monetary resources
necessary to mount a defense. For this reason, scholars liken such
behavior to “trademark extortion.”272 First, trademark owners rely
267
Lucasfilm, Ltd. v. Media Mkt. Group, Ltd., 182 F. Supp. 2d 897, 899 (N.D. Cal.
2002). Of course, the various circuits vary in their requirements for a preliminary
injunction, but Media Market Group is an illustrative example.
268
See discussion supra Part I.B.1.
269
See discussion supra Part I.B.3.
270
Lemley & Volokh, supra note 259, at 173 (quoting Vance v. Universal Amusement,
445 U.S. 308 (1981)).
271
See Kravitz, supra note 75, at 150–51 (“This decision to enjoin showings of [Debbie
Does Dallas] to protect the plaintiff’s reputational interest in its trademark cannot be
reconciled with [F]irst [A]mendment principles. There was no finding that the
defendant’s film was obscene under [F]irst [A]mendment standards.”).
272
See Kenneth L. Port, Trademark Extortion: The End of Trademark Law, 65 WASH.
& LEE L. REV. 585, 589 (2008); see also McGeveran, Rethinking, supra note 31, at 64
(quoting Port, supra, at 585).
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on the fact that people making expressive uses of trademarks lack
an understanding of the nuances of trademark law.273 Thus, the
mark owners likely presume, in the face of uncertain legal
standards and doctrines, recipients will accede to a cease-anddesist letter rather than taking their chances in court.274 Because
markholders especially target uses that reference sexuality or are
sexually explicit, they may believe that the lack of clarity in
tarnishment law could be a sufficient deterrent in and of itself.
Second, it is likely that the cost of litigation will be daunting
for the recipient of a cease-and-desist letter, and this will lead him
or her to “settle the case and self-censor . . . speech rather than
fight in court for the right to use particular language.”275
Furthermore, those who do find representation are few and far
between.276 The defendant in Walking Mountain Productions,
Thomas Forsythe, for example, spent “five months searching for
legal representation,” and during that time, a “‘long list of
attorneys suggested that [he] just give up, since [he] hadn’t made
any money anyway.”277 Eventually, the ACLU and a California
firm agreed to represent him, but when all was said and done, his
overall defense “topped two million dollars.”278 Pro bono

273

See McGeveran, Rethinking, supra note 31, at 111 (“The more serious impact
emerges earlier, before any suit is filed, when the chilling effects occur. Imagine an
average person—not a lawyer—who is contemplating an unlicensed expressive use of a
trademark and understandably worries about liability. The person asks an attorney for
advice. The bottom line of the response should be that courts usually favor expressive
uses. But, it will need to be accompanied by a lengthy memo, full of caveats, which cites
in the alternative to a series of amorphous precedents, warns that those cases are all factspecific, and predicts that litigation may be protracted. This response might not inspire
great confidence.”); see also COOMBE, supra note 23, at 78 (“Faced with the threat of
litigation, most local parodists, political activists, and satirical bootleggers will cease their
activities.”).
274
See COOMBE, supra note 23, at 78.
275
Ramsay, supra note 29, at 405; see also McGeveran, Four Free Speech Goals,
supra note 197, at 1220 (“Cost is especially important because many cease-and-desist
letters from well-financed markholders target isolated individuals using trademarks
expressively.”).
276
See, e.g., McGeveran, Four Free Speech Goals, supra note 197, at 1221.
277
Id.
278
Id.
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representation for people like Thomas Forsythe and Justin Watt is
the exception, not the rule.279
D. Are Cease-and-Desist Letters a Replacement for a Lawsuit?
Perhaps the most disturbing trend regarding cease-and-desist
letters is that they may prove more efficacious than lawsuits. As
indicated above, the frequency of filed and litigated dilution
lawsuits has dwindled since 1996.280 Overall “[t]rademark
litigation has seen a precipitous drop since 2001.”281 At the same
time, however, “the number of initial claims of trademark
infringement filed per year is increasing.”282 Moreover, “[a]s the
number of cases initially filed continues to go up, the percentage of
cases that reach a trial on the merits, the total number of cases
reported, the total amount of damages, and the total number of
cases where an injunction is demanded are all decreasing.”283
According to Professor Port, one explanation for these figures is
trademark extortion: “[Trademark owners] file suit with no intent
to prosecute it to a conclusion on the merits. Therefore, the
number of cases initially filed increases, but the number of cases
that reach a trial on the merits remains constant and all other
indicators decline.”284
These numbers may be instructive in the cease-and-desist
context as applied to tarnishment and other forms of action. If
trademark owners are increasingly filing weak lawsuits as a form

279

See also Smith v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 537 F. Supp. 2d 1302 (2008) (defendant
parodist of Wal-Mart’s mark was represented by Paul Alan Levy at Public Citizen, a
nonprofit consumer advocacy group).
280
See supra Part I.B.5; see also Port, supra note 272, at 626 (“It may have been pent
up demand or the novelty of the dilution cause of action that caused the larger numbers of
dilution claims in the late 1990s, but there has been a general downward trend in dilution
cases for eight of the ten years for which there is data.”). But see supra notes 178, 188,
243.
281
Port, supra note 272, at 622.
282
Id.
283
Id. at 633. For example, in 1995, 2595 infringement claims were filed, id. at 618
(graph L), and 60 claims reached a trial on the merits, for a total percentage of 2.3% of all
claims. Id. at 619 (graph N). In 2005, however, 3636 claims were filed, id. at 618 (graph
L), but only 51 claims reach a trial on the merits, for a total percentage of 1.43% of all
claims. Id. at 619 (graph N).
284
Id. at 633.
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of extortion to silence speech, they are probably also wielding a
more potent and unregulated weapon in their arsenal even more
frequently—the cease-and-desist letter.285 Indeed, the cease-anddesist letter is quicker and cheaper than filing a trademark suit, and
it is more efficacious.
Thus, as these figures suggest and the analyses above indicate,
there is much to be concerned about in the realm of pre-litigation
cease-and-desist letters. The following section will examine the
routes courts and legislators should consider in curbing potentially
abusive behavior.
III. REMEDIES: DOCTRINAL AND PROCEDURAL
As the previous sections have demonstrated, tarnishment law
has played an increasingly smaller role in the courts, but may still
be thriving in pre-litigation maneuvers. At the same time, the
recipients of cease-and-desist letters are at a disadvantage: they
have less money to litigate than behemoth trademark owners do
and are less knowledgeable about permissible uses of a trademark.
On the one hand, honing tarnishment’s substantive law may create
greater certainty for those familiar with trademark law. A
clarification in the law could delineate what kinds of sexually
explicit material are tarnishing and what are not. There is no
guarantee, however, that the average cease-and-desist recipient
will understand or have access to these clarified standards,286 nor
that trademark owners will heed newly defined contours of
tarnishment law.287 Thus, while doctrinal adjustments are useful,
procedural mechanisms that punish and deter overreaching by
trademark holders are necessary ingredients to protect trademark
recoders. This Part will examine some recent proposals to improve
dilution law’s substantive standards, as well as trademark law’s

285

See id. at 589 (“[S]ome trademark holders send thousands of cease-and-desist letters
to the point that there are now ‘sample’ cease-and-desist letters available on the internet.
These cease-and-desist letters are followed by hundreds of trademark infringement
filings. These cases are almost never prosecuted to a conclusion on the merits.”
(footnotes omitted)).
286
See supra notes 272–74 and accompanying text.
287
See infra Part III.A–B.
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procedural mechanisms.288 Moreover, it will suggest that
tarnishment may have outlived its usefulness and that other areas
of the law could provide better protection for brands while being
solicitous of speech concerns with respect to sex and sexuality.
A. Doctrinal Adjustments
1. Clarify the Exemptions in the TDRA
Perhaps the best place to start in terms of doctrinal
clarifications is with the language of the TDRA. As discussed
supra in Part I, the TDRA exempts fair uses of a mark “other than
as a designation of source for the person’s own goods or services”
which includes parody, criticism of, or commentary on a mark.289
It also exempts “any noncommercial use.”290 This creates a
redundancy in the statute, as Professor McGeveran expresses:
parody, comment, and critique all seem to fall under the rubric of
“noncommercial use.”291 McGeveran’s solution to this issue is
simple—he
propose[s]
that
Judge
Kozinski’s
broad
interpretation of the noncommercial use exemption
from dilution liability should remain in force, either
as a matter of consistent interpretation and
constitutional avoidance or, if necessary, through
amendment of the statute. Any expressive use that
does more than “propose a commercial transaction”
should be immune from dilution liability, regardless
of any other considerations. Because there is no
reason to limit this rule to federal dilution claims,
courts should apply it to state claims as well.292
At first blush, McGeveran’s proposal is a clear, administrable
one, and it could help protect the interests of people who seek to
expressively recode trademarks by referencing sexuality or
288
Note that this is just a sampling of attractive options. A more fulsome examination
of all options is beyond the scope of this paper.
289
15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(3) (2006).
290
Id.
291
See McGeveran, Rethinking, supra note 31, at 108–09.
292
Id. at 116.
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sexuality suggestive content. At the same time, though, perhaps
McGeveran’s proposal could run into the same difficulties faced
by courts currently deciding dilution actions—how exactly does
one define speech that “does more than ‘propose a commercial
transaction’”? Should this definition parallel analyses on broader
First Amendment jurisprudence?293 Is this proposed exemption so
broad that it swallows the rule? Thus, though it seems to be a clear
rule ex ante, its contours still contain ambiguity that either the
courts or legislative action would need to dispel.
2. Align the Contours of Tarnishment with Obscenity Law?
In addition to a clarification of statutory exemptions,
tarnishment law could benefit from a clearer definition of what
uses are likely to tarnish a mark. As discussed in Part I.B.3 supra,
after the enactment of the FTDA in 1995, courts continued to rely
on pre-FTDA language defining tarnishing uses.294 To wit: “a
trademark may be tarnished when it is ‘. . . portrayed in an
unwholesome or unsavory context,’ with the result that ‘the public
will associate the lack of quality or lack of prestige in the
defendant’s goods with the plaintiff’s unrelated goods.’”295 To
courts, “unwholesome or unsavory” was (and sometimes still is)
synonymous with “sexual activity [or] obscenity.”296
This
language was too simplistic and helped lead some courts to make
incorrect assessments of tarnishing uses.
Indeed, as one
commentator has noted, subject-matter based assessments of
tarnishment are
untenable for two related reasons: (1) courts are not
competent to make value judgments regarding the
293

See, e.g., Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60 (1983) (holding that
unsolicited mailings are entitled to First Amendment protection as commercial speech).
294
See supra Part I.B.3.
295
Hormel Foods Corp. v. Jim Henson Prods., Inc., 73 F.3d 497, 507 (2d Cir. 1996)
(emphasis added) (quoting Deere & Co. v. MTD Prods., Inc., 41 F.3d 39, 43 (2d Cir.
1994)).
296
See id. (citations omitted); see also V Secret Catalogue, Inc. v. Moseley, 605 F.3d
382, 389 (6th Cir. 2010) (“Thus, any new mark with a lewd or offensive-to-some sexual
association raises a strong inference of tarnishment. The inference must be overcome by
evidence that rebuts the probability that some consumers will find the new mark both
offensive and harmful to the reputation and the favorable symbolism of the famous
mark.”).
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worth of different types of speech; and (2) courts
will encounter a line-drawing problem, already
evident in the case law. The inherent problem with
singling out cases for tarnishment liability based on
the wholesomeness of their respective associations
—for example, illegal drugs or pornography—is
that courts are essentially permitted to make value
judgments regarding the worthiness of specific
types of speech. An artist’s or commentator’s legal
rights should not depend on whether an individual
judge “gets” the humorist’s joke or the critic’s
jab.297
For example, in American Dairy Queen Corp. v. New Line
Productions, Inc.,298 the district court granted an injunction against
the use of the title “Dairy Queens” for an off-color comedy about
beauty pageants on both infringement and tarnishment grounds.299
Invoking the Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders “alternative avenues”
test, the court ruled that the movie title was a commercial use, and
that it could have sought other ways to convey its message.300 It
then proceeded to find a likelihood of dilution by tarnishment of
the plaintiff’s “Dairy Queen” mark.301 According to the court, the
film’s objectionable material included “backbiting and jealousy,”
“eating disorders,” and “off-color humor.”302 Certainly this was a
broad interpretation of what could “tarnish” a mark; it seems that
any humor that was not squeaky-clean could have passed muster
under the court’s assessment. The district court in American Dairy
Queen thus broadened the scope of tarnishment to any unwanted
connotations of a mark.
In the context of sexuality, if tarnishment has a substantive
component, it should be no broader than truly obscene material
under Miller v. California’s303 standards, and it should accord with
297

Gulasekaram, supra note 95, at 911.
35 F. Supp. 2d 727 (D. Minn. 1998).
299
Id. at 735.
300
Id. at 732. This decision could also have benefited from a more liberal Kozinskiesque conceptualization of “noncommercial use.”
301
Id. at 733.
302
Id. at 729.
303
413 U.S. 15 (1973). The Miller obscenity test is as follows:
298
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the noncommercial use exemption in the TDRA. This approach
could help assuage trademark holders’ understandable fears about
truly disgusting commercial uses of their mark, without reaching
expression that is merely off-color or even slightly offensive.
Thus, commercial pornographic uses with no possible redeeming
artistic virtues could be reached under such a standard. One caveat
to this approach is that the noncommercial use exemption could
not be so broad so as to encompass all obscene uses.
Noncommercial use and Judge Kozinki’s “noncommercial speech”
formulation would require some line-drawing in order to appease
legitimate trademark-holder concerns about truly denigrating and
obscene uses of their marks. This approach could further address
concerns about the uses of child-oriented trademarks in truly
explicit ways.
B. Procedural Mechanisms
Procedural mechanisms turn the focus on the more
sophisticated party in cease-and-desist battle: the trademark owner.
It is these mechanisms, perhaps more than a clarification of
substantive standards, that can deter trademark overreaching by
overzealous mark owners. They thus can provide more clarity ex
ante for trademark owners than doctrinal rules that may or not be
malleable.
1. Trademark Misuse
Trademark misuse is an equitable defense akin to the doctrine
of unclean hands.304 According to Professor McCarthy, it “does
not form the basis for an affirmative claim for recovery.”305 While
patent and copyright regimes have embraced some form of misuse,

(a) whether “the average person, applying contemporary community
standards” would find that the work, taken as a whole, appeals to the
prurient interest, (b) whether the work depicts or describes, in a
patently offensive way, sexual conduct specifically defined by the
applicable state law; and (c) whether the work, taken as a whole,
lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value.
Id. at 24 (internal citations omitted).
304
See 6 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR
COMPETITION § 31:44 (4th ed. 2009).
305
Id.
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“trademark misuse garners little acceptance from courts or
commentators today.”306 As William E. Ridgway has noted,
however, instituting some form of trademark misuse in litigation
could be a potential deterrent against abusive and unmeritorious
cease-and-desist letters, particularly when sent to individuals who
engage in criticism or parody.307
Ridgway maintains that
trademark misuse could protect speech interests in pre-litigation
correspondence better than doctrinal protections in court can:
[C]ertain kinds of coercive conduct undermine
free speech independent of formal First Amendment
defenses—the paradigmatic example being prelitigation threats sent to alleged infringers or
internet intermediaries based on dubious
claims. Misuse restores this constricted free speech
space by providing a more aggressive weapon than
a First Amendment shield.308
Ridgway’s test is two-fold; it would examine (1) whether the
trademark holder incorrectly asserts its rights, and (2) whether the
trademark owner had an improper purpose in doing so.309 This
doctrine could be subsumed under section 1115(b)(9) of the
Lanham Act, as an equitable defense in litigation.310
But Ridgway poses a more stringent and effective mechanism
for using the trademark misuse doctrine—as an affirmative cause
of action akin to section 512(f) of the Digital Millennium
Copyright Act (the “DMCA”).311 Such a provision would punish
unmeritorious cease-and-desist letters by awarding costs and
attorney’s fees, and, in the case of willful or knowing behavior,
treble damages.312 One caveat to Ridgway’s affirmative cause of
action, however, is the Noerr-Pennington doctrine, “which, on the
basis of the First Amendment’s Petition Clause, immunizes from
306

Ridgway, supra note 233, at 1553.
See id. at 1548–49.
308
Id. at 1574.
309
Id. at 1566–67.
310
Id. at 1583–84; see also 15 U.S.C. § 1115(b)(9) (2006) (“That equitable principles,
including laches, estoppels, and acquiescence are also applicable.”).
311
See Ridgway, supra note 233, at 1586 (citing 17 U.S.C. § 512(f)).
312
Id.
307
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liability individuals who petition the judiciary by, for example,
bringing a lawsuit.”313 Immune petitioning will prevent liability
from resulting, unless it is sham litigation.314 As Ridgway notes,
most circuit courts hold that cease-and-desist letters enjoy
immunity under the doctrine.315 The Tenth Circuit, however, has
bucked this trend and held that the Noerr-Pennington Doctrine
does not immunize private party pre-litigation correspondence.316
If Ridgway’s proposal were to avoid any Noerr-Pennington
difficulties, it could prove to be a formidable weapon in a wouldbe trademark recoder’s arsenal. When faced with a meritless
cease-and-desist letter, he or she could have some degree of
certainty that fighting the letter would not prove unduly
burdensome. The difficulty lies, as with doctrinal solutions, in the
fact that recipients of cease-and-desist letters may not avail
themselves of such a defense, and they may not understand which
claims are truly abusive and meritless. Moreover, some trademark
holders might forge ahead with weak cease-and-desist claims
without heeding such retributive consequences. Nonetheless, the
trademark misuse doctrine could prove a deterrent for many
trademark holders who do not wish to risk paying costs, attorneys’
fees, or treble damages.
2. Anti-SLAPP Protection
Another prophylactic measure against unfounded cease-anddesist tarnishment letters is protection under anti-SLAPP statutes.
“SLAPPS are by definition meritless suits. Plaintiffs intend not to
win but to intimidate and harass political critics into silence.”317
An anti-SLAPP statute protects against such meritless suits.318
Such statutes generally include:
313

Id.
Id.
315
Id. at 1587.
316
Id. (citing Cardtoons, L.C. v. Major League Players Ass’n, 208 F.3d 885, 889–90
(10th Cir. 2000)).
317
John C. Barker, Common-Law and Statutory Solutions to the Problems of SLAPPs,
26 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 395, 399 (1993) (internal citations and quotations omitted).
318
See Lauren McBrayer, Note, The DirecTV Cases: Applying Anti-Slapp Laws to
Copyright Protection Cease-and-Desist Letters, 20 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 603, 609–11
(2005).
314
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the establishment of a process for motions to
dismiss or strike claims targeting public
participation; the expedited hearing of such motions
and suspension or significant curtailment of
discovery until the court rules on the motion; and a
cost-shifting award of attorneys fees and costs
payable by the filer to the target when the target
prevails on its motion to dismiss.319
Under California’s anti-SLAPP laws, protection extends to the
right of petition or free speech “in connection with a public issue
or an issue of public interest.”320 At least twenty-six states in
addition to California have enacted anti-SLAPP statutes.321
The prospect of anti-SLAPP protection for would-be
defendants in trademark litigation could be a strong deterrent
against trademark overreaching through cease-and-desist letters.
Much like the trademark misuse doctrine, such protection focuses
on the wrong-doing of the trademark holder, who is the party in a
better position to know about the intricacies of trademark law. As
with trademark misuse, though, it is possible that an overzealous
trademark holder may choose to ignore the possibility of antiSLAPP reprisals, relying on a would-be defendant’s lack of
knowledge and sophistication in this area of the law.
It is worth mentioning, though, that such protection is not
unknown in trademark dilution cases. In the Burnett case, for
example, the defendant, Fox, filed a special motion to strike under
California’s anti-SLAPP provision.322 Although the motion was
mooted on jurisdictional grounds,323 it does illustrate that
trademark defendants may use this tool as a weapon in their
defensive arsenal, especially in the tarnishment arena. Widespread
availability of such a statute in trademark litigation may help curb
pre-litigation abusive behavior, lest the overreaching plaintiff get
319

Id. at 610.
Id. (quoting CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 425.16 (West 2004)).
321
See CALIFORNIA ANTI-SLAPP PROJECT, http://www.casp.net/statutes/menstate.html
(last visited Apr. 21, 2010).
322
Burnett v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 491 F. Supp. 2d 962, 966 (C.D. Cal.
2007).
323
Id. at 974.
320
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hit with an anti-SLAPP motion to dismiss and face attorneys’ fees
and costs.
3. Fee-shifting
As mentioned in the previous sections, fee-shifting may also
work as a deterrent to trademark holders.
As Professor
McGeveran suggests,
fee-shifting is another possible procedural tool to
discourage nonmeritorious litigation against
expressive uses and support impecunious
defendants. There is already a provision of the
Lanham Act allowing courts to impose defense
costs on plaintiffs in “exceptional cases.” The
photographer in “Food Chain Barbie” secured this
relief, but in general it is unusual. This presumption
should shift.
Courts should presume that
unsuccessful lawsuits against expressive uses
represent exceptional cases eligible for awards of
attorneys’ fees unless the plaintiff can show that
they were particularly close cases.324
As McGeveran indicates, fee-shifting provisions may be a
strong deterrent against the rampant practice of sending cease-anddesist letters. Such a provision could induce trademark holders to
be more judicious with the claims that they file, and perhaps even
in the claims they assert in pre-litigation correspondence.
Trademark holders may find that it is not worth their while to risk
losing costs and fees for claims that will, in the best possible
outcome, get thrown out at the summary judgment phase.
C. The Remedial Recipe?
The remedy to frequent and often meritless cease-and-desist
letters in the tarnishment arena thus must address substantive
concerns (What is noncommercial use? What are the contours of
tarnishment itself?), as well as procedural remedies that serve as
stringent deterrents to trademark holders. One drawback to these
remedies, however, is that they involve doctrinal mechanisms
324

McGeveran, Rethinking, supra note 31, at 123 (footnotes omitted).
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asserted once litigation has begun. As expressed above, recipients
of cease-and-desist letters often capitulate to trademark holders’
demands before ever reaching the formal litigation stage. Thus,
such recipients may benefit from an affirmative cause of action at
the pre-litigation stage based on the trademark misuse doctrine or
anti-SLAPP statutes.
One option that Congress should explore, for example, is an
inexpensive and quick process to obtain declaratory judgment of
the recoder’s expressive rights based upon a wrongful claim in a
cease-and-desist letter. Such a cause of action could be subsumed
within the TDRA.325 Trademark holders, however, may try to
invoke the Noerr-Pennington doctrine against such an affirmative
cause of action, claiming that pre-litigation correspondence is
proper petitioning to the government. However, it is worth
exploring this option for the sake of those who use trademarks in
purely expressive, non-actionable ways, and who do not have the
resources to defend their expressive rights at trial.
D. Has Tarnishment Overstayed Its Welcome?
While doctrinal adjustments and procedural mechanisms may
afford recoders increased protections when they encounter ceaseand-desist letters that have no substantive bases in law, perhaps it
is time to go further and reconsider tarnishment as a cause of
action altogether. As noted by Professor Beebe, dilution law in
general largely has become redundant of trademark infringement
actions.326 Tarnishment has lived on in cease-and-desist practice,
however, and this is inherently problematic because, as noted in
Part II.C, trademark holders may take advantage of unsophisticated
recipients and malleable legal standards to silence speech in a
private action form of restraint. If tarnishment has all but
disappeared in the courts, and is subject to being abused outside
the courtroom, does it still serve a purpose? Should we dispense
with it altogether?
325

Cf. Jennifer M. Urban & Laura Quilter, Efficient Process or “Chilling Effects?”
Takedown Notices Under Section 512 of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, 22 SANTA
CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 621, 629–30 (2006) (detailing the remedies for bad
faith DMCA takedowns codified in the Copyright Act at 17 U.S.C. § 512(f) (2006)).
326
See Beebe, supra note 30, at 458–59.
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As some scholars have suggested, product disparagement or
trade libel law, which is a subset of defamation law, could address
trademark owners’ concerns about brand image.327 Such a
standard could hew closely to the general definition in section
623A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts for “Liability for
Publication of Injurious Falsehood”:
One who publishes a false statement harmful to the
interests of another is subject to liability for
pecuniary loss resulting to the other if
(a) he intends for publication of the statement
to result in harm to interests of the other having
a pecuniary value, or either recognizes or should
recognize that it is likely to do so, and
(b) he knows that the statement is false or acts
in reckless disregard of its truth or falsity.328
Further, trademarks could fall under the rubric of public
“figures,” who must meet an actual malice standard in order for
their owners to collect damages under New York Times Co. v.
Sullivan.329 Additionally, trade libel could reach only statements
of fact, not opinion or fictional representations;330 such a standard
would allow for recoders to enjoy greater leeway in using marks in
expressive
and
artistic
works
regardless
of
the
327

See, e.g., Kravitz, supra note 75, at 152–53 (“Product disparagement laws, not
tarnishment rationale, should set bounds on political and artistic commentary. A
trademark owner damaged by false and injurious statements of fact retains a cause of
action. But in fictional or satirical contexts where no statement of fact can reasonably be
inferred, trademarks should not be protected against mere tarnishment by noncommercial expression. If Rev. Jerry Falwell cannot succeed on a cause of action against
an advertising parody suggesting he had a sexual encounter with his mother while drunk
in an outhouse, why should an inanimate trademark enjoy greater protection against
similar slurs?” (footnotes omitted)); cf. Mary LaFrance, No Reason to Live: Dilution
Laws as Unconstitutional Restrictions on Commercial Speech, 58 S.C. L. REV. 709, 721
(2007) (“Tarnishment is like trade libel without the falsehood; instead of disparaging the
product or service in a way that can be proven true or false, tarnishment is a less direct
swipe, one which merely tries to alter public opinion rather than disseminate false
information.”).
328
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 623A (1977).
329
376 U.S. 254, 279–80, 283–84 (1964); see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§
623A, 626; Kravitz, supra note 75, at 152–53 (using Jerry Falwell as an example of a
public figure).
330
See Kravitz, supra note 75, at 153.
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commercial/noncommercial distinction. The strict parameters of
libel law could thus prevent overreaching by trademark holders
while addressing legitimate concerns about truly harmful product
disparagement. While adopting this standard does not directly
affect cease-and-desist practice per se, it would eliminate an
amorphously powerful legal standard from a trademark holder’s
arsenal.
In addition, truly explicit uses of trademarks could fall directly
under obscenity law. It is true that obscenity law necessarily relies
on community standards to deem whether a use is truly
offensive,331 which may fall prey to the same concerns of
subjective taste as an assessment of tarnishment would. And yet,
“community standards” refer to the community as a whole, and not
just one particular judge or jury. In addition, utilizing obscenity
law to determine whether a use is legally “obscene” would allow
for a more searching inquiry under the First Amendment than an
assessment of tarnishment would afford.332
This section does not purport to exhaust all the possible
substitutions for tarnishment as a cause of action, nor does it seek
to address all the ramifications of eliminating tarnishment from
trademark law. It merely suggests that perhaps we can better
address expressive interests and legitimate trademark owners’
concerns in a different legal arena. Perhaps, however, relying on
trade disparagement and obscenity laws will merely shift ceaseand-desist practice to focus on these doctrines instead. Perhaps
trademark owners will fall back on an old friend—plain vanilla
trademark infringement—to protect brand image. But it may just
be that removing tarnishment from markholders’ arsenals will
begin to reign in the kind of overreaching that the TDRA
exemptions and relevant case law have not prevented.

331

See Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1974); supra note 303.
See Ramsay, supra note 29, at 413 (noting that courts generally view trademarks as
“speech that is protected by the First Amendment but subject to more regulation than
other types of fully protected speech”).
332
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CONCLUSION
Since the enactment of the FTDA and the TDRA, courts have
largely fallen out of love with the tarnishment cause of action.
Plaintiffs bring these claims less frequently and have less frequent
success. While the substantive law of tarnishment has arguably
become more favorable to expressive uses, even when those uses
toe the line of propriety, trademark owners have turned to out-ofcourt measures to protect brand images. Cease-and-desist letters
based on tarnishment have thus increased, and it is likely that the
amount of speech chilled by these letters has increased as well.
These propositions have become evident as websites like the
Chilling Effects Clearinghouse document the scope and frequency
of cease-and-desist letters. However, the lucky few who can afford
to fight claims of tarnishment or who can obtain pro bono legal
representation (Justin Watt, the Courage Campaign, Thomas
Forsythe) are few and far between.
The stakes are high in this area of law. Would-be recoders and
brand commentators need to know that their creative reimaginings
will not land them in court. Thus, as this Note has tried to
demonstrate, the law needs to change substantively, and it needs to
afford clear procedural mechanisms for these individuals to assert
their rights. As Judge Kozinski presciently observed, trademark
owners “must give up some measure of control” 333 when their
brands become part of pop culture. They must understand that not
all interpretations of trademarks will be favorable or in line with
the image they cultivate. Most importantly, though, they must
understand that there are limits to the amount of trademark
protection they receive,334 and that overzealous assertions of their
trademark rights through tarnishment claims is bad behavior, plain
and simple.

333

Kozinski, supra note 1, at 975.
See Leval, Trademark, supra note 142, at 205 (“The purpose of the trademark laws
is not to prevent people from saying nasty things about others but to permit entities in
commerce to identify their goods or services to the public.”).
334

